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INTRODUCTION
Much like federalism itself, U.S. energy policy relies heavily on the coordination of state and local governments. Building
new high-voltage transmission lines is essential for large-scale
energy projects such as wind turbine farms and solar thermal
facilities—and increasingly also is necessary for large-scale energy storage. But each state controls its own project approval
process through agency siting and judicial eminent domain pro1
ceedings, so any project spanning multiple jurisdictions depends on the coordination of multiple states. Most states grant
their public utility commissions (PUCs) authority to review and
1. In previous work we each have focused on legal aspects of electric
power transmission line siting. See, e.g., Ashley C. Brown & Jim Rossi, Siting
Transmission Lines in a Changed Milieu: Evolving Notions of the “Public Interest” in Balancing State and Regional Considerations, 81 U. COLO. L. REV.
705 (2010) (highlighting how state public utility laws tend to embrace a narrow definition of “public interest” in siting proceedings); Alexandra B. Klass,
The Electric Grid at a Crossroads: A Regional Approach to Siting Transmission Lines, 48 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1895 (2015) (suggesting options for creating
regional authority for transmission line siting); Alexandra B. Klass, Takings
and Transmission, 91 N.C. L. REV. 1079 (2013) (addressing mismatch between
some state eminent domain laws and state preferences for energy development); Alexandra B. Klass & Elizabeth J. Wilson, Interstate Transmission
Challenges for Renewable Energy: A Federalism Mismatch, 65 VAND. L. REV.
1801 (2012) (highlighting the need for process preemption and additional federal encouragement for states to join regional efforts to address transmission);
Jim Rossi, The Trojan Horse of Transmission Line Siting Authority, 39 ENVTL.
L. 1015 (2009) (arguing that focus on expanding federal transmission siting
authority is misplaced, given the need of federal regulators to address other
issues such as energy efficiency and cost allocation in operation of the grid).
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approve transmission lines based on a determination of whether there is a “need” for the line, alternatives to the line, and the
potential environmental impacts of the line. If successful, the
line receives a certificate of need, sometimes also called a “certificate of public convenience and necessity.” For example, a
transmission line connecting proposed wind turbines in Wyoming to export power supply to customers in California must
pass through and seek regulatory approvals in at least two oth2
er states. States also play the primary role in the approval of
interstate oil pipelines, as reflected by Nebraska’s longstanding
3
objections to the location of the proposed Keystone XL pipeline.
Though some national interest in connecting the supply
and demand of energy across jurisdictions seems obvious, existing law allows a state regulator to reject an electric transmission line or oil pipeline proposal for almost any reason—
including, at the extreme, anticompetitive or protectionist mo4
tivations. State or local decision makers have rejected project
applications outright where regulators determine that local
5
firms or consumers will not benefit. In some instances, a state
or local agency regulator can lack statutory authorization to
even consider an application from a non-local project develop6
er. For example, in approving a 500-mile, $2 billion “Rock Island Clean Line” electric transmission project to allow wind
2. See Rebecca Smith & Michael Calia, Companies Propose $8 Billion
Green-Energy Project for California, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 23, 2014, 5:23 PM),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/companies-propose-8-billion-green-energy-plan-for
-los-angeles-1411478019.
3. Most recently, following much back and forth between the Nebraska
governor, legislature, and courts, the Nebraska Supreme Court rejected a constitutional challenge to the state’s oil pipeline siting and approval process on
standing grounds but, after the TransCanada filed eminent domain proceedings, landowners filed a new lawsuit challenging the law. See Thompson v.
Heineman, 857 N.W.2d 731 (Neb. 2015); Grant Schulte, Nebraska Opponents
of Keystone XL Oil Pipeline Reignite Legal Fight, STAR TRIB. (Sept. 29, 2015),
http://www.startribune.com/keystone-xl-developer-drops-landowner-lawsuits
-in-nebraska/330005521/.
4. Federal statutes relegate to the states primary authority over the siting and permitting approval for interstate electric transmission lines and oil
pipelines. See infra Part I (describing state public interest determinations and
the state and local eminent domain process). By contrast, under section 7 of
the Natural Gas Act, the Federal Energy Regulation Commission (FERC) has
plenary authority to conduct the review of a proposed interstate gas pipeline
(including a right of eminent domain). FERC determines whether a proposed
pipeline meets the “public convenience and necessity” and, although it coordinates with state and federal environmental agencies in pipeline review, it possesses the ultimate power of eminent domain. See 15 U.S.C. § 717f (2012).
5. See infra Part III.A.
6. See infra Part III.C.
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power from Iowa and other plains states to reach Chicago customers, Illinois regulators were presented with objections from
property owners and Commonwealth Edison, the state’s largest
electric utility, both of which argued that the project developer
did not qualify for eminent domain because it was not a “public
7
utility” under state law.
As much as any contemporary issue in American federalism, multi-state energy infrastructure project approval illus8
trates the challenge of regulatory “holdouts.” As with private
property holdouts, a government decision whether to coordinate
with other jurisdictions depends on how the benefits of participating in a multi-state project are perceived. Citizens in an energy destination state like California may stand to benefit as
consumers through decreased electricity costs, more diversified
sources of power supply, and increased availability of renewable energy to meet state mandates. However, a government
regulator in a “pass-through” state, which would neither export
nor consume power from a proposed transmission line, is especially likely to face considerable interest group pressure to hold
out from approving a project. Indeed, if the regulator evaluating such a project defines the benefits narrowly to focus only on
in-state firms or citizens (i.e., those who are most likely to be
voting in that state’s elections), and if in assessing project costs
the regulator concentrates on anticipated costs to those same
7. See Julie Wernau, Clean Line’s Wind Power Superhighway Approved
in Illinois, CHI. TRIB. (Nov. 25, 2014, 3:51 PM), http://www.chicagotribune
.com/business/ct-clean-line-1126-biz-20141125-story.html. The same project is
facing vocal opposition from landowners in Iowa, which has yet to approve it.
See Thousands Voice Concern over Rock Island Clean Line, RADIOIOWA (Nov.
25, 2014), http://www.radioiowa.com/2014/11/25/thousands-voice-concerns-over
-rock-island-clean-line.
8. In this Article we focus on multi-state projects, though some of the
same tensions can certainly arise with inter-local project approval. A county
disagreeing with an adjacent municipal government can present a similar dynamic. Of course, legal analysis of this problem could differ to the extent that
interstate commerce is not implicated by entirely intrastate projects; still,
dormant Commerce Clause principles have also been applied to intra-state
conflicts between utilities. See, e.g., Shelley Ross Saxer, Eminent Domain,
Municipalization, and the Dormant Commerce Clause, 38 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
1505, 1524–25 (2005) (explaining that dormant Commerce Clause principles
may keep municipalities from establishing programs which may impact or
burden interstate commerce). It is also well established that a state cannot
selectively protect parts of its geographic market, while claiming other parts
are open to interstate commerce. See Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v.
Mich. Dep’t of Nat. Res., 504 U.S. 353, 361 (1992) (“[O]ur prior cases teach
that a State . . . may not avoid the strictures of the Commerce Clause by curtailing the movement of articles of commerce through subdivisions of the
State, rather than through the State itself.”).
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firms or citizens (as is often perceived), the project probably
will not gain approval. To name one example, Wisconsin regulators have faced considerable opposition to a proposed electric
transmission line that is primarily intended to benefit produc9
ers and customers in other states.
At the same time, as with private property holdouts, a decision not to approve a project can present externalities in the
form of impacts (both positive and negative) that transcend any
particular state’s borders. For example, a multi-state infrastructure project may serve regional or even national interests
in enhancing grid reliability, promoting energy diversity, or
addressing climate change. In short, under existing law, regulators considering multi-state infrastructure projects are often
confronted with a jurisdictional mismatch between those who
stand to benefit the most from a project, and those who are anticipated to bear its costs. This invites and increases the likelihood of isolationist holdouts that can serve as a barrier to new
multistate energy projects and initiatives.
Recent developments in federal constitutional law favor
deference to state legislative and regulatory determinations as
a way of promoting federalism, increasing even further the potential for regulatory holdouts to impede coordination. The
Roberts Court’s application of dormant Commerce Clause review, along with recent federal appellate court cases reviewing
state energy and climate change initiatives, show some judicial
reluctance to scrutinize the federalism implications of individ10
ual state decisions. On top of this, after the Supreme Court’s
11
2005 decision in Kelo v. City of New London, courts also routinely defer to state or local determinations of “public use” (including recent state legislation that narrows definitions of public use to protect private property) for purposes of assessing
whether an eminent domain action is valid under the Fifth
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.
The energy infrastructure coordination problem is readily
solvable by Congress, if it were so inclined. Under the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution, Congress could establish a
federal process for siting and eminent domain for interstate
electric transmission lines and oil pipelines similar to the re9. See Mike Ivey, Environmentalists Split over Badger-Coulee Power
Line, CAP. TIMES (Dec. 9, 2014), http://host.madison.com/news/local/writers/
mike_ivey/environmentalists-split-over-badger-coulee-power-line/article_5483
79a0-7fcb-11e4-9748-27b73b15eee6.html.
10. We discuss this line of cases infra at Part II.
11. 545 U.S. 469 (2005); see infra Part III.B.
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gime it created in the 1930s for interstate natural gas pipe12
lines. Under the Natural Gas Act, a company seeking to build
an interstate natural pipeline applies for a certificate of public
convenience and necessity from the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission (FERC) and if approved, the pipeline company is
given federal eminent domain authority to build the pipeline
13
and state law is preempted. In 2005, Congress declined to significantly expand FERC or other federal agency authority over
electric transmission line siting, and new congressional action
along these lines appears highly unlikely in the current political climate in the absence of a major blackout or other disas14
ter. Just as important, there are strong state and local land
use interests that are vocally opposed to any expansion of federal preemption of energy infrastructure siting and permit15
ting.
In recognition that congressional action is not forthcoming,
this Article considers ways in which constitutional dormant
Commerce Clause principles can help address the state holdout
problem while still preserving federalism principles, such as
state sovereignty over land use. We advance an argument for
revitalizing dormant Commerce Clause review of discriminatory state siting and eminent domain regimes, with the goal of
better promoting interstate coordination in energy markets.
Application of dormant Commerce Clause principles and doctrine calls into question whether broad judicial deference to
state siting and eminent domain decisions under the banner of
federalism makes sense, especially given the interstate coordination problem. Our analysis also has important implications
for the considerations that state or local regulators balance as
they make their decisions under existing regulatory siting and
eminent domain regimes. Courts routinely accept state regulatory procedures so long as they meet Due Process requirements, but our approach highlights how, in this context and
others, the dormant Commerce Clause provides an important
12. One proposal for federal preemption along such lines is discussed in
Klass & Wilson, supra note 1, at 1859–69.
13. 15 U.S.C. § 717f (2012); see also Minisink Residents for Envtl. Pres. &
Safety v. FERC, 762 F.3d 97 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (describing broad FERC authority over siting and eminent domain for interstate natural gas pipelines).
14. See Klass & Wilson, supra note 1, at 1818–19; Rossi, supra note 1, at
1033–38.
15. See, e.g., Nancy A. McLaughlin, Condemning Open Space: Making
Way for National Interest Electric Transmission Corridors (or Not), 26 VA.
ENVTL. L.J. 399 (2008) (highlighting land use and environmental concerns
presented with expansive condemnation of open space for transmission projects).
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safeguard against state and local regulatory procedures that
enable economic protectionism.
Part I presents the multi-state coordination problem as
posing a real tension among states in the United States today,
using interstate electric transmission line projects as an example. One solution to regulatory holdouts between jurisdictions is
for states to bargain among themselves to arrive at a multistate solution—either through regional governance or through
private compensation to dilute interest group dynamics supporting holdouts. Unfortunately, these interstate bargaining
solutions do not occur routinely today in the context of electric
transmission line siting. Regional governance solutions have
proved ineffective at promoting coordination in transmission
line approval because, short of formal and binding interstate
compacts, state regulators lack the authority to address the
holdout problem on their own. While Congress has given advanced consent to the creation of interstate transmission siting
16
compacts, no such agreements have been adopted to date,
perhaps because pass-through states do not perceive reciprocal
benefits and lack strong incentives to make binding commitments. It is certainly possible that project developers could offer payments to private entities and local governments in passthrough states, perhaps creating sufficient in-state benefits to
overcome regulatory and public opposition. However, this kind
of private Coasean bargaining approach (where holdouts are offered some form of payment to cooperate with others) has also
fallen short of its theoretical ideal. This is in part because of
remote benefits and uncertainty, given that many multi-state
projects will not realize benefits for decades into the future and
there is frequently a manifold potential for private or regulatory holdouts. We describe how the interest group dynamic, coupled with many existing siting and eminent domain laws, enables, and may even encourage, these kinds of state and local
government holdouts.
Part II highlights one promising and under-examined legal
basis for addressing state holdouts in multi-state infrastructure
16. The 2005 Amendments to the Federal Power Act established advanced
consent for interstate compacts between three or more continuous states. 16
U.S.C. § 824p(i) (2012). The National Center for Interstate Compacts, along
with the Council of State Governments, has even drafted model language to
assist states with these efforts. See Transmission Line Siting Compact, COUNCIL ST. GOV’TS, http://www.csg.org/NCIC/TransmissionLineSitingCompact
.aspx (last visited Oct. 16, 2015). For a discussion of why states have not used
this authority to enter into interstate compacts, see Klass, The Electric Grid at
a Crossroads, supra note 1.
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projects—constitutional dormant Commerce Clause doctrine.
Despite revived interest of late in federalism, the Roberts Court
has not been a champion of invalidating discriminatory state
laws under dormant Commerce Clause principles, particularly
given consistent vocal criticism of the doctrine by Justices Scalia and Thomas. Highlighting the continued relevance of
dormant Commerce Clause doctrine, however, several recent
federal courts have addressed whether state climate initiatives,
including renewable energy requirements, are consistent with
17
federalism. Despite some signals to the contrary, including
dictum from Judge Richard Posner on the U.S. Court of Ap18
peals for the Seventh Circuit, recent appellate court opinions
show some judicial appetite for upholding state clean energy,
19
renewable energy, and carbon emission regulation initiatives.
Against the backdrop of these decisions, the interstate holdout
problem presented by energy infrastructure siting highlights
the need to step back to first principles related to interstate coordination and the political process, in order to evaluate
whether it is appropriate for federal courts to routinely defer to
state regulatory decisions. We advance an alternative approach
to dormant Commerce Clause review that calls for courts to
evaluate whether state or local regulators have been attentive
to benefits outside of the particular jurisdiction as a way of improving the political process behind legislative and regulatory
decisions and better encouraging coordination among states.
Part III evaluates three common features of state siting
and eminent domain regimes against these dormant Commerce
Clause principles and established doctrine. First, we contend
that dormant Commerce Clause doctrine prevents state regulatory agencies from considering only in-state need in granting or
17. See, e.g., Energy & Envtl. Legal Inst. v. Epel, 793 F.3d 1169 (10th Cir.
2015) (upholding Colorado RPS standard against a dormant Commerce Clause
challenge); Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, 730 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir.
2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 2875 (2014) (upholding California renewable fuel
standard); North Dakota v. Heydinger, 15 F. Supp. 3d 891 (D. Minn. 2014)
(holding that a Minnesota ban on new coal-fired power generated in or imported into Minnesota constitutes extraterritorial legislation that violates the
dormant Commerce Clause). A recent case, filed in federal court in 2015, challenges the in-region deliverability requirements of Connecticut’s RPS standard. See Lawsuit Challenges a Bedrock of Connecticut’s Energy Policy,
HARTFORD COURANT (Apr. 28, 2015, 3:16 PM), http://www.courant.com/
business/hc-connecticut-clean-energy-lawsuit-allco-story.html.
18. See Ill. Commerce Comm’n v. FERC, 721 F.3d 764, 776 (7th Cir. 2013)
(noting that a Michigan preference for in-state renewable energy violates
dormant Commerce Clause doctrine).
19. See supra note 17; infra Part II.
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denying certificates of need or state siting permits for multistate transmission lines. Second, we argue that dormant Commerce Clause principles should also prevent state courts from
considering only benefits to in-state residents in making public
use determinations for purposes of eminent domain authority
for multi-state transmission lines. While the U.S. Supreme
Court’s decision in Kelo v. City of New London affords great
20
deference to local “public use” determinations, that case did
not involve a multi-state project where, we maintain, dormant
Commerce Clause principles place independent limits on state
or local decision makers. Third, and most novel, we propose
that dormant Commerce Clause review should serve to protect
against a form of structural discrimination that can be created
by the procedures in many state siting and eminent domain regimes. In particular, some states limit siting applications to only in-state public utilities, or allow only in-state incumbent
firms to challenge or intervene in proceedings regarding new
proposed lines. Even if such procedures are not facially discriminatory, we maintain that litigants should be allowed to present evidence of whether these kinds of procedures produce a
discriminatory effect against out-of-state applicants. Where
there is a discriminatory effect, states should be required to
justify them by reference to a non-discriminatory purpose that
is legitimate and non-illusory—and we argue many of the alleged consumer protection benefits used to justify these kinds
of bans and nonreciprocal procedures do not withstand scrutiny. The constitutional concern we identify is hardly an academic one: for example, FERC Chairman Norman Bay has recently
questioned whether a state right of first refusal for incumbent
utilities to propose transmission lines violates the dormant
Commerce Clause in his concurrences in two FERC decisions
addressing industry compliance with the agency’s electricity
21
transmission planning rules.
Part IV evaluates the scope and practical implications of
our approach to dormant Commerce Clause review. Where an
infrastructure project requires the action of two or more states,
we argue that, at a minimum, each state is not only allowed
20. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 485–89 (2005) (concluding
that “public use,” as the term is used in the Fifth Amendment’s Takings
Clause, need not be interpreted literally to require actual use by the public of
land taken under the power of eminent domain, but should instead be interpreted broadly to include land taken for a “public purpose”).
21. See, e.g., In re Southwest Power Pool, 151 FERC ¶ 61,045, 2015 WL
1736849, at *17–18 (Apr. 16, 2015) (Bay, J., concurring); PJM Interconnection,
LLC, 150 FERC ¶ 61,038 (Jan. 22, 2015) (Bay, J., concurring).
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but is in fact required to consider impacts outside of its particular jurisdiction and make explicit political tradeoffs, especially
before making a decision to hold out from project approval. This
raises some important questions about the scope of our proposal. Importantly, while not a toothless approach to dormant
Commerce Clause review, we do not advance this as a roving
invitation for courts to engage in cost-benefit assessment. We
believe that courts can review how states make their regulatory
decisions without federal judges substituting their own policy
preferences for politically accountable state decision makers. At
the same time, such an approach is not appropriate for every
dormant Commerce Clause challenge. We do not go as far as to
look with suspicion on virtually any state-specific climate initi22
ative or subsidy, as some would. We evaluate the implications
of our approach for other state renewable energy initiatives
that might (implicitly or explicitly) include coordination features, such as the renewable energy initiatives recently upheld
by the Ninth Circuit in Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Co23
rey. In terms of scope, we see our proposal as having the most
direct application in instances where coordination is necessary
to the success of state regulatory goals that are shared by two
or more states, and especially where existing procedures serve
as an obstacle to a state making any regulatory decision in the
first instance.
Part IV also addresses the practical implications of constitutionally requiring state regulators to engage in a more robust, regional cost/benefit assessment where multi-state regulatory approvals are necessary. Given their potential legal
vulnerabilities, we have several suggestions for how states can
reform and clarify their siting and “need” laws and regulations
to allow for some consideration of benefits beyond a particular
state’s borders. We also highlight how state “public use” determinations under the Takings Clause (especially under postKelo statutes that limit or ban economic development takings
in order to expand private property rights protections) are vul22. See, e.g., Steven Ferrey, Carbon Outlasts the Law: States Walk the
Constitutional Line, 41 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 309, 309–13 (2014) (discussing briefly several challenges to California’s energy regulations); Harvey
Reiter, Removing Unconstitutional Barriers to Out-of-State and Foreign Competition from State Renewable Portfolio Standards: Why The Dormant Commerce Clause Provides Important Protection for Consumers and Environmentalists, 36 ENERGY L.J. 45, 50 (2015) (“The focus of this article is on the
pernicious impact of [state] renewable resource legislation . . . .”).
23. Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, 730 F.3d 1070, 1107 (9th
Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 2875 (2014).
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nerable under dormant Commerce Clause principles when they
fail to contain clear safe harbors for interstate energy infrastructure project development. In addition, our dormant Commerce Clause analysis exposes the potential for facial judicial
challenges to state procedures—even (and perhaps especially)
where there is regulatory inaction. Even absent evidence of a
substantial record supporting actual discrimination against a
particular out-of-state producer, it is possible that a state siting
process can violate dormant Commerce Clause doctrine, and we
make several suggestions for how states can reform their procedures to address this concern.
In sum, the dormant Commerce Clause analysis proposed
in this Article is intended to address the holdout problem with
energy infrastructure approvals by state and local regulators
where projects require multi-state coordination, and in particular state laws that facilitate such holdouts by imposing discriminatory substantive or procedural constraints on the siting application process. It is not intended to force a state to adopt
laws and regulations or to exercise eminent domain powers to
benefit the citizens of other states. Nor is it intended to discourage a state from regulating any time that it determines
that regulation imposes broader costs than its citizens, under
principles of fairness, will or should bear. We limit the scope of
our proposal to infrastructure or other projects where the approval of two or more states will be necessary for the project to
go forward at all—though we think there may be opportunities
for extension in other contexts where market coordination is
required to achieve regulatory objectives or where structural
procedures in state laws promote economic protectionism. Judicial evaluation of state regulatory decisions and frameworks
does not authorize federal courts to make the substantive
choice for state regulators, as some skeptics of dormant Commerce Clause review fear. Instead, as we hope our study of
state siting and eminent domain regimes shows, dormant
Commerce Clause review can help to address deficiencies in the
state political process that thwart interstate coordination, making it more likely that when state or local regulators make a
substantive choice, they are considering the broader benefits of
regulatory decisions.
I. THE REGULATORY “HOLDOUT” PROBLEM
Perhaps no issue involving energy and climate regulation
today depends as much on coordination between state regulators as does the siting of interstate electric transmission lines.
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Building transmission lines involves multiple regulatory approvals—and this depends primarily on state regulators. This
Part discusses how, despite significant federal authority over
most aspects of interstate energy markets, expansion of the
transmission grid and the oil pipeline network still depends
heavily on the initiatives of state regulators. We highlight how
these kinds of infrastructure projects depend on interstate coordination and present state and local regulation as a type of
holdout problem that threatens its achievement and its benefits, including addressing climate change issues.
A. THE ENERGY GRID’S SIGNIFICANCE FOR RELIABILITY AND
CLIMATE POLICY
The U.S. electric power grid evolved from independent municipal power systems to interlinked systems designed to promote grid reliability, to the regional, interconnected transmission planning and electric markets that cover much of the
country today. It powers modern society, providing the critical
infrastructure for food, transportation, health care, and virtually every other conceivable need. Today, electricity from nearly
5,800 power plants travels over 450,000 miles of high voltage
transmission lines in the United States, connecting with nearly
6 million miles of lower voltage distribution cables, to provide
24
power to homes, businesses, and industrial facilities. The U.S.
electric grid constitutes an $876 billion asset managed by over
25
3,000 utilities serving nearly 300 million customers.
A 2013 report by the U.S. House of Representatives highlights the importance and vulnerability of the nation’s electric
grid:
The vast majority of grid assets are owned and operated by private
companies and other non-federal institutions. The components of the
grid are highly interdependent and, as history has shown, a line outage or system failure in one area can lead to cascading outages in

24. AM. SOC’Y OF CIVIL ENG’RS, FAILURE TO ACT: THE ECONOMIC IMPACT
CURRENT INVESTMENT TRENDS IN ELECTRICITY INFRASTRUCTURE 4, n.3
(2011),
http://ascelibrary.org/doi/pdf/10.1061/9780784478783
[hereinafter
FAILURE TO ACT]; BIPARTISAN POLICY CTR., CAPITALIZING ON THE EVOLVING
POWER SECTOR: POLICIES FOR A MODERN AND RELIABLE U.S. ELECTRIC GRID
16–17 (Feb. 2013).
25. See MIT, THE FUTURE OF THE ELECTRIC GRID VII (2011); Mark
Chediak et al., Crumbling U.S. Grid Gets Jolt Creating Smarter Power in
Houston, Across County, BLOOMBERG (June 25, 2014), http://www.bloomberg
.com/news/articles/2014-06-25/crumbling-u-s-grid-gets-jolt-driving-smart
-houston-power; HARRIS WILLIAMS & CO., TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION
INFRASTRUCTURE 2 (Summer 2014), http://www.harriswilliams.com/sites/
default/files/industry_reports/ep_td_white_paper_06_10_14_final.pdf.
OF

2015] ENERGY AND DORMANT COMMERCE REVIEW

141

other areas. For example, on August 14, 2003, four sagging highvoltage power lines in northern Ohio brushed into trees and shut off.
Compounded by a computer system error, this shut-down caused a
cascade of failures that eventually left 50 million people without power for two days across the United States and Canada. This event, the
largest blackout in North American history, cost an estimated $6 bil26
lion and contributed to at least 11 deaths.

The U.S. high voltage power system is divided into three
synchronous grids (or “interconnections”)—the Eastern Inter27
connection, the Western Interconnection, and Texas. While
electricity movements within each interconnection are relatively easy, power flows between interconnections are very limited.
Within the interconnections, eight regional entities work with
the non-governmental North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) to ensure the reliability of the high-voltage
power grid. Approximately half of the nation’s electric grid is
further divided among seven Regional Transmission Organiza28
tions (RTOs). These are voluntary associations of utilities and
other grid participants, subject to FERC oversight, which man29
age the grid and regional markets for wholesale power. When
a utility joins an RTO it delegates the operational control of its
30
transmission lines to the RTO.
Many experts warn that the U.S. transmission grid must
be modernized and expanded to maintain reliability, anticipate
increasingly severe weather events brought about by climate
change, address cyber security concerns, and integrate more
domestic renewable energy into the grid to achieve federal and
31
state climate change goals. They point out that power outages
are becoming more frequent in the United States and in order
to maintain even current levels of grid reliability, the electric
26. U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, ELECTRIC GRID VULNERABILITY:
INDUSTRY RESPONSES REVEAL SECURITY GAPS 4 (2013).
27. BIPARTISAN POLICY CTR., supra note 24, at 15; NAT’L ACAD. OF SCIS.
ET AL., AMERICAN ENERGY FUTURE: TECHNOLOGY AND TRANSFORMATION
fig.9.4 (2009).
28. See BIPARTISAN POLICY CTR., supra note 24, at fig.2; MIT, supra note
25, at 4.
29. See BIPARTISAN POLICY CTR., supra note 24, at 21.
30. See
id.
at
16;
Regional
Transmission
Organizations
(RTO)/Independent System Operators (ISO), FERC (July 16, 2015), http://
www.ferc.gov/industries/electric/indus-act/rto.asp; see, e.g., Ill. Commerce
Comm’n v. FERC, 721 F.3d 764, 776 (7th Cir. 2013).
31. See, e.g., FAILURE TO ACT, supra note 24, at 46; BIPARTISAN POLICY
CTR., supra note 24, at 28–33, 79, 101; RICHARD J. CAMPBELL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R423923, ELECTRICAL POWER: OVERVIEW OF CONGRESSIONAL
ISSUES 7 (2013) (discussing the aging nature of the transmission grid); MIT,
supra note 25, at 77; Klass, Takings and Transmission, supra note 1, at 1115–
16; Klass & Wilson, supra note 1, at 1812–14; Rossi, supra note 1, at 1019.
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industry must make total investments on the scale of $1.5 to $2
trillion dollars and investments in transmission and distribu32
tion alone of nearly $900 billion. Likewise, a 2013 White
House report notes that “[s]evere weather is the number one
cause of power outages in the United States and costs the economy billions of dollars a year in lost output and wages, spoiled
inventory, delayed production, inconvenience and damage to
33
grid infrastructure.” More important, the report points out
that the “aging nature of the grid,” most of which was constructed over a period of more than one hundred years, makes
the country more susceptible to severe weather-related power
34
outages. The report also warns that the number of outages
caused by severe weather events is expected to rise as climate
change increases the frequency of floods, blizzards, and hurri35
canes. “In 2012, the United States suffered eleven billiondollar weather disasters—the second-most for any year on rec36
ord, behind only 2011.” Indeed, the blackouts caused by Hurricane Sandy on the east coast in 2012 have called into question the ability of the U.S. transmission infrastructure to
withstand more frequent extreme weather events, which may
37
be made worse by climate change.
Although demand for electricity increased 25% between
1990 and 2009, transmission construction deceased by 30%
32. See, e.g., THE BRATTLE GRP., TRANSFORMING AMERICA’S POWER INTHE INVESTMENT CHALLENGE 2010–2030 iv–xi (Nov. 2008), http://
www.eei.org/ourissues/finance/Documents/Transforming_Americas_Power_
Industry_Exec_Summary.pdf (summarizing the costs of grid investment);
Massoud Amin, Toward a More Secure, Strong, and Smart Electric Power
Grid, IEEE SMART GRID, http://smartgrid.ieee.org/newsletter/january-2011/
105-toward-a-more-secure-strong-and-smart-electric-power-grid (last visited
Oct. 16, 2015) (“In the electricity sector, outages and power quality disturbances cost the economy, on average, more than $80 billion annually and sometimes as much as $188 billion in a single year.”); Chediak et al., supra note 25
(“Power outages are up 285 percent since 1984 and the U.S. ranks last among
the top nine western industrialized nations in the average time it takes to get
the lights back on after power failures. Outages cost businesses as much as
$150 billion a year in lost continuity. . . .”); Jonathan Fahey, U.S. Power Grid
Costs Rise but Service Slips, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Mar. 5, 2013), http://bigstory
.ap.org/ article/us-power-grid-costs-rise-service-slips.
33. EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, ECONOMIC BENEFITS OF INCREASING ELECTRIC GRID RESILIENCE TO WEATHER OUTAGES 4 (Aug. 2013), http://
energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2013/08/f2/Grid%20Resiliency%20Report_FINAL
.pdf.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. See, e.g., Matthew L. Wald & John Schwartz, Rise in Weather Extremes Threatens Infrastructure, N.Y. TIMES, July 26, 2012, at A4.
DUSTRY:
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during the same period. While more recent investments in
transmission show an improved outlook through 2020, a signif39
icant investment gap remains. The American Society of Civil
Engineers estimates that failure to address transmission grid
needs will result in annual costs to businesses and households
as a result of blackouts and brownouts of $23 billion in 2020,
40
increasing to $44 billion by 2040. Moreover, some experts
opine that the EPA’s Clean Power Plan—designed to significantly reduce use of coal-fired power and replace it with gas
turbines and renewable energy—cannot succeed without major
expansions to the electric transmission grid to connect these
new generation resources to load centers and ensure reliabil41
ity.
As for increasing the role of renewable energy in the U.S.
energy portfolio, it is important to keep in mind that, unlike
traditional energy sources for electricity (such as coal and natural gas, which can be transported to power plants near load
centers by train, truck, ship, or rail), renewable energy in the
form of wind or solar power can only be transported to load centers through electric transmission lines. This presents a challenge because the best on-shore sources of wind and solar energy are often far from population centers, with wind resources
centered in the upper Midwest and Plains states and solar re42
sources centered in the desert southwest. Major new transmission infrastructure built in areas of the country currently
not well served by long-distance, high-voltage, electric transmission lines is critical to integrating these resources into the
grid.

38. AM. SOC’Y OF CIVIL ENG’RS, 2009 REPORT CARD FOR AMERICA’S INFRASTRUCTURE 134 (2009).
39. See generally EDISON ELEC. INST., TRANSMISSION PROJECTS AT A
GLANCE iii (March 2014) (showing increases in transmission investment from

2011–13 but then a projecting a slight decline in investment from 2013–16).
40. FAILURE TO ACT, supra note 24, at 40.
41. See Peter Behr, Can EPA’s Climate Plan Work Without a National
Transmission Plan?, ENERGYWIRE (Jan. 9, 2015), http://www.eenews.net/
stories/1060011373.
42. United States—Annual Average Wind Speed at 80 m, NAT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB., http://www.nrel.gov/gis/images/80m_wind/USwind300dpe4
-11.jpg (last visited Oct. 16, 2015); Photovoltaic Solar Resource of the United
States, NAT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB., http://www.nrel.gov/gis/images/eere_
pv/national_photovoltaic_2012-01.jpg (last visited Oct. 16, 2015).
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B. FEDERAL LAWS AND POLICIES FAVORING GRID
DEVELOPMENT
The Federal Power Act of 1935 (FPA) provides the “statutory foundation for regulating the business of transmitting and
43
selling electricity across state lines.” The FPA grants FERC
jurisdiction over “transmission of electric energy in interstate
commerce” and “the sale of electric energy at wholesale in in44
terstate commerce.” States, however, retain authority over retail electricity sales and over the location and construction of
45
both intrastate and interstate electric transmission lines. This
stands in stark contrast to FERC’s authority in the area of natural gas, where it has jurisdiction over both the pricing of natural gas transportation rates as well as the approval of inter46
state natural gas pipelines.
Until recently, the electric industry was vertically integrated with investor-owned utilities (IOUs) owning generation
facilities, transmission lines, and distribution lines and states
granting them exclusive service territories for selling electricity
to customers. The regulatory structure created in the FPA,
with some modifications contained in the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 (PURPA), remains mostly in place to47
day. PURPA expanded FERC’s jurisdiction over interstate
electricity transmission. In addition, PURPA provided incentives for the growth of renewable energy resources for electric
power generation, requiring utilities to buy back the surplus
power from alternative generators at the same rate it would
cost the utilities to produce the power (known as the utility’s

43. New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. 1, 18–20 (2002).
44. 16 U.S.C. § 824(b) (2012).
45. The FPA expressly states that FERC
shall not have jurisdiction, except as specifically provided in this subchapter and subchapter III of this chapter, over facilities used for the
generation of electric energy or over facilities used in local distribution or only for the transmission of electric energy in intrastate commerce, or over facilities for the transmission of electric energy consumed wholly by the transmitter.
Id.; see also New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. at 5–8.
46. Natural Gas Act, 15 U.S.C. § 717–717z (2012); Minisink Residents for
Envtl. Pres. Safety v. FERC, 762 F.3d 97 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (describing broad
FERC authority over transportation and sale of natural gas in interstate
commerce, including federal siting and eminent domain authority for interstate natural gas pipelines); see also 15 U.S.C. § 717f (FERC authority over
siting and eminent domain for interstate natural gas pipelines).
47. See LINCOLN L. DAVIES ET AL., ENERGY LAW AND POLICY 306–12, 435
(2014) (“[W]ith respect to rates and siting, transmission regulation at the beginning of the 21st century looks very much like it did throughout the 20th.”).
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“avoided cost”). This helped to usher in a new era of interstate
energy markets by allowing non-utility generators to compete
with investor-owned utilities (IOUs), which otherwise often had
monopoly power over electricity sales and transmission lines
49
within their service territories. From the perspective of power
supply, the electric industry has undergone a remarkable
transformation nationwide. As of 2013, non-utility generators,
known as “independent power producers,” owned approximately 40% of the nameplate generation capacity that produces elec50
tricity.
At the retail sales level, however, the industry is far less
competitive. Today, IOUs sell 68% of retail electricity in the
United States with public municipal utilities selling 15%, rural
electric cooperatives 13%, and power marketers only about
51
4%. In exchange for this “natural monopoly” over retail sales,
IOUs are subject to state requirements that electricity rates
remain reasonable and service is not provided in a discriminatory manner. Many states began to restructure their electricity
markets in the 1990s to split the vertically integrated utility
functions of generation, transmission, and distribution and create a more market-based system, but the Enron scandal and
problems in California led many states to revert back to their
original structures. Today, about half the states are traditionally regulated and the rest are restructured or partially restructured—creating a fragmented and very parochial approach to
52
regulating many aspects of the industry.
Congress built on the FPA and PURPA in the Energy Policy Act of 1992, in which it authorized FERC to require utilities
to grant widespread access to the transmission grid, creating
53
more opportunities for competition in power supply. Congress
followed this with the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (EPAct 2005),
48. See id. at 393–94, 481–83.
49. See id.; see also Richard D. Cudahy, PURPA: The Intersection of Competition and Regulatory Policy, 16 ENERGY L.J. 419 (1995).
50. See U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., ELECTRIC POWER ANNUAL 2013,
tbl.4.4 (2015), http://www.eia.gov/electricity/annual/pdf/epa.pdf.
51. As of 2014, the percentage of total electricity sold by the various types
of power providers was: investor-owned utilities (68.5%), publicly owned utilities (14.4%), electric cooperatives (12.8%), federal power agencies (less than
1%), and power marketers (4.3%). AM. PUBLIC POWER ASS’N, 2014–15 ANNUAL
DIRECTORY & STATISTICAL REPORT 26 (2014).
52. Status of Electricity Restructuring by State, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN.,
http://www.eia.gov/electricity/policies/restructuring/restructure_elect
.html (last visited Oct. 16, 2015).
53. See 16 U.S.C. § 824j–824k (2012); Klass & Wilson, supra note 1, at
1816.
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which Congress enacted to diversify fuel sources, promote energy efficiency, and strengthen the interstate electric transmis54
sion system. EPAct 2005 amended the FPA and added a number of policies to create explicit federal “backstop” siting
authority for interstate electric transmission lines in areas of
the country subject to significant transmission congestion by
55
allowing FERC to override certain state siting decisions.
However, despite federal endorsement of multiple goals related
to expanding the transmission grid, the direct impact of these
federal siting provisions has been extremely limited, in no
small part because federal courts have interpreted these statutes as granting FERC very little real authority to override
56
state transmission siting decisions. Since EPAct 2005, Congress authorized $4.5 billion in the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 to modernize the country’s transmission
57
grid. The Obama Administration has also created an Interagency Rapid Response Team for Transmission to coordinate
the siting of interstate electric transmission lines that cross
federal lands and to integrate more renewable energy into the
58
grid.
Although there is still virtually no federal authority over
electric transmission line siting off federal lands, the laws
summarized above did grant FERC authority to require utilities, RTOs, and states to engage in planning for interstate
transmission lines and to increase access to the grid for renewable and other non-utility generators. FERC has exercised this
authority by issuing industry-wide regulations in three major
sets of orders (all challenged in court and upheld), which have
consistently emphasized the fundamental importance of transmission infrastructure to the operation of interstate energy
markets:
54. See Klass & Wilson, supra note 1, at 1861; see also DAVIES ET AL., supra note 47, at 463–64 (discussing EPAct 2005).
55. See 16 U.S.C. § 824p; Klass & Wilson, supra note 1, at 1818–19 (discussing FERC backstop siting authority).
56. See Klass & Wilson, supra note 1, at 1817–19; see also Piedmont
Envtl. Council v. FERC, 558 F.3d 304, 313 (4th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S.
Ct. 1138 (2010) (interpreting FERC’s backstop siting authority narrowly and
invalidating FERC rule that would allow it to override state denial of a transmission line siting permit).
57. See DAVIES ET AL., supra note 47, at 718–19; Recovery Act, U.S. DEP’T
OF ENERGY, http://energy.gov/oe/information-center/recovery-act (last visited
Oct. 16, 2015).
58. Interagency Rapid Response Team for Transmission, WHITE HOUSE,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/administration/eop/ceq/initiatives/interagency
-rapid-response-team-for-transmission (last visited Oct. 16, 2015).
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Order 888 (1996): Required all transmission line owners
subject to FERC jurisdiction to allow “open access” to electricity
transmission by transmitting wholesale power at rates, terms,
and conditions identical to those applied to their own wholesale
59
power supplies. This order served to usher in unbundling of
transmission from power supply, which would be priced com60
petitively by market-based rates.
Order 2000 (1999): Encouraged the creation of RTOs,
which as discussed above operate the transmission grid in organized markets to provide access at unbundled rates estab61
lished through a single grid-wide tariff. In follow-up regulations implementing this, FERC required transmission line
operators to include large generator interconnection procedures
62
and agreements in their transmission tariffs, and required
public utilities to participate in open and transparent trans63
mission-planning processes.
Order 1000 (2011): Directed RTOs, utilities, and states to
cooperate and consider the benefits of interstate electric transmission lines. It required each public utility transmission provider to (1) participate in a regional transmission planning process; (2) establish procedures to identify transmission needs
based on public policy requirements (including state renewable
energy goals) in state or federal laws and regulations and evaluate proposed solutions; and (3) coordinate with public utility
transmission providers in neighboring transmission-planning
regions to determine solutions to mutual transmission needs.
One purpose of the order was to give more priority to lines that
will serve renewable energy goals and to make those lines more
64
affordable by sharing the cost of those lines over a wider area.
Thus, there is an established federal policy supporting interstate power markets, on which Congress, FERC, and courts
have all agreed: Congress has given FERC authority to set fed59. Order No. 888, FERC Stats. & Regs., 75 FERC ¶ 31,036, 18 C.F.R. pts.
35 & 385 (1996), aff’d, New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. 1 (2002).
60. See David B. Spence, Can Law Manage Competitive Energy Markets?,
93 CORNELL L. REV. 765, 773–74 (2008).
61. Order No. 2000, FERC Stats. & Regs., 89 FERC ¶ 61,285, 18 C.F.R.
pt. 35 (1999), appeals dismissed sub nom. Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1 v. FERC, 272
F.3d 607 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
62. Order No. 2003, FERC Stats. & Regs., 104 FERC ¶ 61,103, 18 C.F.R.
pt. 35 (2003).
63. Order No. 890-A, FERC Stats. & Regs., 121 FERC ¶ 61,297, 18 C.F.R.
pt. 37 (2007).
64. Order No. 1000, FERC Stats. & Regs., 136 FERC ¶ 61,051, 18 C.F.R.
pt. 35 (2011), aff’d, S.C. Pub. Serv. Auth. v. FERC, 762 F.3d 41 (D.C. Cir.
2014).
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eral policies on interstate electric transmission line planning
and approval to increase reliability and to increase the use of
renewable energy in the electricity grid. For nearly three decades FERC has consistently used the authority granted to it by
Congress and the courts to expand interstate energy markets
over electricity—in a manner parallel to FERC’s development
65
and expansion of interstate markets over natural gas. FERC’s
major market restructuring initiatives addressing competitive
wholesale power supply and transmission access and planning
have also consistently met success before the judiciary.
Despite these actions by Congress and FERC, the simple
reality is that, as we discuss below, under existing law, transmission line siting and permitting decisions remain state prerogatives. For example, one of the prominent interstate electric
transmission line projects put on the “fast-track” under the
Obama Administration’s Rapid Response Team for Transmission described above is the SunZia Southwest Transmission
Project, which has been in the review and planning process
66
since 2008. This project consists of two bi-directional 500-kV
lines in Arizona and New Mexico designed to spur development
of renewable energy in those states and is hoped to be in ser67
vice by 2018. In January 2015, the U.S. Department of Interior announced with great fanfare the approval of the lines
across federal lands, which required significant negotiations
between numerous federal agencies including the Department
of Defense, which operates a missile site on land along the pro68
posed line. But almost immediately after announcement of the
federal approval, the New Mexico Land Commissioner announced a 60-day “hold” on the project to address issues associated with the lines’ impact on state public lands and expressed
concern that the state had not had a sufficient voice in the pro69
ceedings to date.
65. See generally Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Reconstituting the Natural Gas
Industry from Wellhead to Burnertip, 9 ENERGY L. J. 1 (1988) (discussing government regulation of the natural gas industry).
66. See Rachel Giron, Struggles on the Path to Renewable Energy: Lessons
from SunZia, 54 NAT. RESOURCES J. 81 (2014) (examining the SunZia project
and offering solutions to issues that may arise during the transmission siting
process); SUNZIA, http://www.sunzia.net (last visited Oct. 16, 2015).
67. See SUNZIA, supra note 66.
68. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Interior, Interior Department Greenlights
Transmission Line to Modernize Grid, Unlock Renewable Energy Sources in
Southwest (Jan. 24, 2015), http://www.doi.gov/news/pressreleases/interior
-department-greenlights-transmission-line-to-modernize-grid-unlock
-renewable-energy-sources-in-southwest.cfm.
69. Associated Press, NM Land Commissioner Puts the Brakes on SunZia,
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C. STATE REGULATORY PRIMACY OVER SITING AND EMINENT
DOMAIN
As noted above, although FERC has jurisdiction over
wholesale, interstate power sales and may act to prevent discrimination in access to transmission lines, it is the states that
exercise primary authority over the permitting and siting of
transmission lines. Thus, an interstate line must receive approval from all the states in its path following each state’s permitting processes and standards. Most states grant their public
utility commissions (PUCs) authority to review and approve
transmission lines based on a determination of whether there is
a “need” for the line, alternatives to the line, and the potential
environmental impacts of the line. If successful, the line receives a certificate of need, sometimes also called a “certificate
of public convenience and necessity.” Once the transmission operator receives its certificate, in most states that authorizes it
to exercise the power of eminent domain to build the line if voluntary negotiations for easements with landowners fail. In a
few states, a transmission operator may exercise eminent do70
main even without obtaining a certificate of need.
States differ as to whether only “public utilities,” which sell
power directly to customers within the jurisdiction, can exercise
eminent domain authority to build transmission lines or
whether that authority also extends to “independent transmission companies” and “merchant transmission companies.” These are companies that do not own generation assets or sell retail electricity, as do public utilities, but instead are simply in
business to build transmission lines and to operate the lines. As
71
we discuss below, some states specify by statute that only
public utilities can exercise eminent domain to build transmission lines and thus merchant transmission lines do not have
that power. Other states specify by statute that transmission
lines are a per se “public use” for Takings Clause purposes and
do not specifically limit eminent domain authority to public
utilities. Other states’ statutes, however, are unclear as to what
types of entities qualify to exercise the power of eminent do-

ALBUQUERQUE J. (Jan. 29, 2015), http://www.abqjournal.com/533310/news/
nm-land-commissioner-puts-the-brakes-on-sunzia.html.
70. Details and examples are discussed in Brown & Rossi, supra note 1, at
714–27. See also infra Part III.A (discussing factors balanced in a certificate of
need determination).
71. See infra Part III.C (discussing limits on siting applicant due to public
utility status).
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72

main for electric transmission lines.
The virtually exclusive state authority over electric transmission line siting and eminent domain authority stands in
contrast to the regulatory regime for interstate natural gas
73
pipelines. Under the Natural Gas Act, FERC has exclusive jurisdiction to grant siting certificates for interstate natural gas
pipelines, and the certificate authorizes the natural gas pipeline company to exercise eminent domain authority in all the
74
states through which the proposed pipeline will pass. Although the drastically different permitting authorities for interstate electric transmission lines and interstate natural gas
pipelines may seem surprising, federal regulation of each industry arose in very different eras with very different con75
cerns. The interstate natural gas industry was relatively new
in the 1930s and there were significant concerns about discrimination, overcharging customers, and unfair negotiations with
producers and pipelines, many of which sold gas on a national
76
scale. The same concerns regarding the electricity industry
were not as prevalent at that time, with states regulating most
utilities and grids and most utilities producing and selling
77
power in a much more localized fashion than they do today.
D. THE PUBLIC GOVERNANCE “HOLDOUT” PROBLEM WITH THE
TRANSMISSION GRID
Transmission lines remain extremely unpopular. Although
everyone wants the grid to work and the lights to go on, few
people want high-voltage transmission lines near their homes
and businesses or, worse, on their properties. Indeed, even
though environmental nonprofit groups generally favor renewable energy, they have historically been the primary plaintiffs
in lawsuits challenging transmission lines on environmental
78
protection and aesthetic grounds. Although this has shifted
somewhat in recent years as many environmental groups rec72. See infra Part III.B (discussing eminent domain issue).
73. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
74. See, e.g., Klass, The Electric Grid at a Crossroads, supra note 1 (discussing federal process for obtaining approval and eminent domain authority
for interstate natural gas pipelines).
75. See Klass & Wilson, supra note 1, at 1862–64.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 1897–99.
78. See, e.g., Robert L. Glicksman, Energy Transmission Across Wild and
Scenic Rivers: Balancing Increased Access to Nontraditional Power Sources
with Environmental Protection Policies, 34 PUB. LAND & RESOURCES L. REV. 1,
6 (2013); McLaughlin, supra note 15, at 404–05.
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ognize that interstate electric transmission lines are critical to
integrating large-scale wind and solar energy into the grid,
79
public opposition to transmission lines remains. Moreover, in
many cases where a new transmission line is proposed to bring
power across state lines, in-state residents often see themselves
as incurring only the costs of the line and none of the benefits
of the line. It is not surprising, then, that when a state PUC or
a state court is considering the “need” for the line or whether
the line is a “public use,” it will weigh the interests of its own
citizens more heavily than those in other states who are not
natural constituents of the state agency or court. Indeed, under
most state statutes authorizing PUCs to approve transmission
lines based on “need,” there are no specific provisions authorizing state PUCs to consider regional need as opposed to in-state
80
need. The same is true for a state court determination of “public use” under the applicable state statute or the state constitu81
tion.
From a public governance perspective, this can be understood as a regulatory “holdout” problem. Building a new transmission line requires the coordination of two or more states.
Each state may incur costs in issuing a siting permit or granting eminent domain power. However, each state may not value
the benefits of siting the transmission line in the same manner.
The benefits of a new line are especially likely to be questioned
in a “pass-through” state, which will not directly benefit from
either the export of power or from the consumption of out-ofstate sources of electricity. Regulators in such states are likely
to face political pressure from both property owners and consumer groups to oppose such lines. In addition, regulators may
face strategic pressure from incumbent firms who own transmission lines—often public utilities who have a monopoly over
incumbent customers within the jurisdiction—and who stand to
lose a share of the current market power to competitors. In this
context, incentives surrounding the private interest group dynamic can also present the possibility for a state or local government actor to hold out.
In theory, any project developer could buy out private
holdouts, as is well chronicled in the law and economic litera79. See, e.g., John Dillon, Energy Bill Splits Environmentalists over Role
of Act 250, VT. PUB. RADIO (Mar. 19, 2013, 7:34 AM) http://www.vpr.net/
news_detail/97837/energy-bill-splits-environmentalists-over-role-act/ (discussing split in environmental community over renewable energy development);
Ivey, supra note 9.
80. See infra Part III.
81. Id.
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ture surrounding property law. Of course, this can be incredibly
costly where a transmission line crosses a large number of
property owners’ parcels—and especially when these property
owners are not concentrated in the same geographic area but
instead span hundreds of miles and multiple jurisdictions. In
addition, non-land use interest groups complicate the public
governance holdout aspect of siting transmission lines. Consumer interests often oppose lines, out of fears that they will
bear new costs in the future. So too do competitors, such as the
incumbent utility firm that opposes a line or would prefer to
own and control it locally. This makes for a particularly difficult type of interest group maneuvering for any developer who
wishes to present a transmission line as a win-win proposition
for all affected stakeholders. Looking to the pragmatics of modern transmission line projects, some transmission line developers certainly have attempted forward-looking initiatives to discourage such holdouts, such as investing in community
outreach and public projects that may be attractive to a state
and its citizens, such as parks and bike paths, as well as more
82
attractive payment structures. However, most transmission
line developers rely on revenue streams over time to finance
their projects and, given that these projects already face high
capital costs and risks, they may lack the up-front capital necessary to go beyond traditional easement-based payments. This
is a context where eminent domain approvals remain essential
for a project to succeed, and public governance holdouts can
serve as an obstacle to a project getting off the ground in the
first place.
By limiting the substantive considerations for a regulatory
decision, or by limiting participation in the process, the regulatory frameworks of state siting and eminent domain law may
enable these kinds of state holdouts. For instance, in Mississippi Power and Light Co. v. Conerly, the Mississippi Supreme
Court held in 1984 that there was no “public necessity” and no
“public use” for a line proposed by a Mississippi power company
82. See Dan Haugen, If Landowners Get Annual Payments for Wind Turbines, Why Not Transmission Lines, MIDWEST ENERGY NEWS (Oct. 23, 2013),
http://www.midwestenergynews.com/2013/10/23/if-landowners-get-annual
-payments-for-wind-turbines-why-not-transmission-lines; Lu Nelson, From the
Ground up: Addressing Key Community Concerns in Clean Energy Transmission, CTR. FOR RURAL AFF. (2013), http://files.cfra.org/pdf/Energy-From-the
-Ground-Up.pdf; Rosalie Winn, Landowner Compensation in Transmission Siting for Renewable Energy, CTR. FOR RURAL AFF. (May 2014), http://www.cfra
.org/sites/www.cfra.org/files/publications/landowner-compensation-052014_0
.pdf.
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to transmit power from the state to a Louisiana power company
83
for distribution in Louisiana. The Mississippi PUC had granted a certificate of public convenience and necessity for the line,
and when the company sought to take property in the line’s
path by eminent domain, the landowners argued there was no
84
public necessity or public use for the line. In siding with the
landowners, the state supreme court quoted the lower court’s
findings and agreed that “[n]ot one Mississippi customer is to
be served by the transmission line,” “that the terms ‘public necessity’ and ‘public use’ . . . contemplate use by the citizens of
this state,” and that the power company’s contention that it
would be able to run power back to citizens of Mississippi in the
85
future if warranted was speculative. Similarly, in Clark v.
Gulf Power Co., the Florida District Court of Appeal held in
1967 that a state’s power of eminent domain exists “only within
its territorial limits for the use and benefit of the people within
86
the state.” Thus, a “one way transmission line” from Florida to
Georgia from which Florida citizens “will not derive one iota of
87
benefit” was outside the state’s eminent domain authority.
Similarly, as we discuss below, many states limit procedural
rights in eminent domain and siting proceedings, including who
88
can apply and who can intervene to challenge a decision.
Although the regulatory holdout problem we describe is, by
its very nature, beyond the power of any individual state to
solve on its own, not every state’s regulatory process succumbs
to it. Some states have adopted broader definitions of need and
public use that encompass out-of-state benefits, including improvements to reliability. In Oxendine v. PSI, the Indiana
Court of Appeals held in 1980 that a power company could exercise eminent domain authority to build a line to increase the
reliability of the network, even though it would not provide
89
electricity to customers in its service territory. In rejecting the
challenge by landowners to the eminent domain action, the
court held that the grant of eminent domain authority was to
furnish electricity to “the ‘public’ not to Indiana residents
90
alone.” States facing incentives to export power for economic
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
1980).
90.

460 So. 2d 107, 113 (Miss. 1984).
Id. at 108–13.
Id. at 113.
Clark v. Gulf Power Co., 198 So. 2d 368, 371 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967).
Id.
See infra Part III.C.
Oxendine v. Pub. Serv. Co. of Ind. 423 N.E.2d 612, 617 (Ind. Ct. App.
Id. at 617.
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development purposes also may be likely to view public purpos91
es in an expansive manner. For example, the North Dakota
Supreme Court held in 1976, in Square Butte Electric Cooperative v. Hilken, that an electric cooperative could exercise eminent domain to build a line to provide electricity to its members
92
in Minnesota. In finding a public use, the court held that citizens of North Dakota would benefit from the additional reliabil93
ity the line would provide to the electric grid as a whole. The
concurring opinion by Justice Pederson relied on the broad
statutory grant of eminent domain authority to build transmission lines which he stated was a reflection of the state’s desire
to “market our natural resources and excess energy” and to
94
“bolster[] the state economy.”
II. FEDERALISM, POLITICAL PROCESS, AND
INTERSTATE COORDINATION
While most states have not addressed the issue of how
broadly to interpret their statutes governing “need” and “public
use” in the context of interstate electric transmission lines, the
issue is certain to arise much more frequently as new lines are
proposed to be built across the country. Moreover, the potential
conflict between localized state interests and federal or regional
interests in promoting interstate lines will become increasingly
acute because of the regionalization of the grid, the new investments utilities and merchant companies are making in interstate transmission, and the new federal policies in place to
promote interstate energy markets and to plan interstate lines
for reliability and renewable energy purposes.
Dormant Commerce Clause doctrine derives from the U.S.
Constitution’s grant of power to Congress “[t]o regulate Com95
merce . . . among the several states.” Modern dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence “is driven by concern about ‘economic protectionism—that is, regulatory measures designed to
benefit in-state economic interests by burdening out-of-state
96
competitors.’” Contemporary judicial skeptics, most prominently Justices Scalia and Thomas, refer to the doctrine as the
“negative” Commerce Clause, indicating its lack of any explicit
91. See Brown & Rossi, supra note 1, for further discussion.
92. 244 N.W.2d 519, 530 (N.D. 1976).
93. Id. at 526–27.
94. Id. at 532 (Pederson, J., concurring).
95. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
96. Dep’t. of Revenue of Ky. v. Davis, 553 U.S. 328, 337–38 (2008) (quoting New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 273 (1988)).
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textual basis in the Constitution. At the extreme, Justice
98
Thomas has indicated he would scrap the doctrine altogether;
while skeptical about the doctrine, Justice Scalia seems more
inclined to want to follow the longstanding precedent that sup99
ports it but limit its scope. Even beyond its most extreme critics, from time to time the Supreme Court has questioned the
judiciary’s institutional capacity to use dormant Commerce
Clause doctrine to scrutinize state regulations in any consistent
or principled way, especially since courts lack the expertise or
political accountability of legislators or regulators in assessing
the costs and benefits of state initiatives—a concern the Roberts Court has cited in recent opinions that narrow application
100
of the doctrine.
Despite criticism from some corners, dormant Commerce
Clause doctrine limits on state protectionism have a longstanding basis in constitutional law and continue to be widely under101
stood as essential to American understandings of federalism.
As Justice Cardozo famously remarked in striking down a New
York law that set minimum prices all milk dealers were required to pay New York milk producers, the Commerce Clause
prohibits a state law that burdens interstate commerce “when
97. This skeptical view has been criticized for its misplaced reading of
constitutional text, history, and federalism. See, e.g., Brannon P. Denning,
Why the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV Cannot Replace the
Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine, 88 MINN. L. REV. 384 (2003) (questioning
whether using other textual provisions of the Constitution to limit state regulations impairing trade can advance the same federalism values as dormant
Commerce Clause doctrine); Barry Friedman & Daniel T. Deacon, A Course
Unbroken: The Constitutional Legitimacy of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 97
VA. L. REV. 1877 (2011) (questioning the accuracy of those who claim no textual or historical support for dormant Commerce Clause doctrine).
98. See, e.g., Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520
U.S. 564, 610–20 (1997) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
99. “I will, on stare decisis grounds, enforce a self-executing ‘negative’
Commerce Clause in two situations: (1) against a state law that facially discriminates against interstate commerce, and (2) against a state law that is indistinguishable from a type of law previously held unconstitutional by this
Court.” West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 210 (1994) (Scalia,
J., concurring).
100. See infra note 110 and accompanying text.
101. As Oliver Wendell Holmes once stated:
I do not think the United States would come to an end if we lost our
power to declare an Act of Congress void. I do think the Union would
be imperiled if we could not make that declaration as to the laws of
the several States. For one in my place sees how often a local policy
prevails with those who are not trained to national views and how often action is taken that embodies what the Commerce Clause was
meant to end.
OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 295–96 (1920).
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the avowed purpose of the [law], as well as its necessary tendency, is to suppress or mitigate the consequences of competi102
tion between the states.” This general principle was also invoked to strike down a New York regulatory scheme that had
been used to deny a license to an out-of-state milk processing
facility. Since the licensing provision had been enacted “solely
[for] protection of local economic interests, such as supply for
local consumption and limitation of competition,” it was found
103
to be unconstitutional.
It is less commonly understood that dormant Commerce
Clause doctrine played an important role in the history of contemporary energy law. Modern federal energy statutes, such as
the FPA, were adopted in large part to address some of the constitutional limits faced by states in regulating energy markets.
Prior to 1935, states possessed the primary authority over energy sales. Courts, however, recognized limits on the ability of
any state to regulate extra-jurisdictional transactions. Most
prominently, in the 1920s, the Supreme Court invalidated
Rhode Island’s regulation of the rates charged by a plant in the
state selling electricity to a Massachusetts company to resell to
a utility serving Massachusetts customers, reasoning that it
104
imposed a “direct burden upon interstate commerce.” These
limits on state authority to regulate extra-jurisdictional energy
transactions came to be known as the “Attleboro Gap,” a jurisdictional problem Congress addressed when it adopted federal
energy statutes in the 1930s. As the Supreme Court has noted,
“When it enacted the FPA in 1935, Congress authorized federal
regulation of electricity in areas beyond the reach of state power, such as the gap identified in Attleboro, but it also extended
federal coverage to some areas that previously had been state
105
regulated.”
Thus, notwithstanding some contemporary critics, dormant
Commerce Clause doctrine is steeped in the American constitutional tradition and remains of particular significance to energy
markets. It is alive and well as a constitutional basis for constraining state and local protectionism, as reflected in the Roberts Court’s consistent refusal to reject the doctrine despite critics on the Court, as well as advocates who regularly plea for the

102. Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 522 (1935).
103. H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 531 (1949).
104. Public Util. Comm’n of R.I. v. Attleboro Steam & Elec. Co., 273 U.S.
83, 89 (1927).
105. New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. 1, 6 (2002).

2015] ENERGY AND DORMANT COMMERCE REVIEW

157

106

doctrine to be abandoned. This Part discusses why dormant
Commerce Clause doctrine is especially well suited to address
problems in energy transportation infrastructure, insofar as it
focuses on promoting a norm of coordination between states
that is essential to both federalism and energy markets. Section A introduces modern dormant Commerce Clause doctrine
and highlights some of the key debates that inform the application of this jurisprudence to the regulation of energy, focusing
in particular on market entry barriers and discriminatory regulations and fees. Section B summarizes the most recent new set
of dormant Commerce Clause challenges to state energy initiatives involving state renewable energy and climate initiatives.
Although these cases have for the most part upheld the primary features of these state initiatives, there remains some uncertainty about how much deference lower courts will afford in
this context. In recognition that courts need to be consistent not
only in doctrine but in the principles that are informing the application of that doctrine, Section C calls for a revitalization of
dormant Commerce Clause review to focus on interstate coordination as an essential federalism value. The holdout problem
faced in energy transportation infrastructure can be overcome
if jurisdictions broaden their assessment of the benefits of projects to include out-of-state interests. We propose a way for
courts to do this that is consistent with existing doctrine and
mindful of concerns regarding potential judicial overreach.
A. DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE DOCTRINE AND ITS
APPLICATION TO ENERGY MARKETS
Modern dormant Commerce Clause doctrine applies three
distinct analytical approaches in assessing whether subnational regulations discriminate against or impermissibly burden interstate commerce. Courts review laws or regulations that discriminate on their face (often called “per se” discrimination) or
discriminate in purpose or effect under a form of strict scrutiny.
106. See, e.g., infra note 110. Underscoring the continued vitality of the
doctrine, the Supreme Court has recently held that Maryland’s income tax for
nonresidents (based on income earned based on work or sources within the
state) is unconstitutional on dormant Commerce Clause grounds. The Court
reasoned that the tax is discriminatory because it fails the “internal consistency” test used to isolate the effects of tax schemes, which “looks to the structure
of the tax at issue to see whether its identical application by every State in the
Union would place interstate commerce at a disadvantage as compared with
commerce intrastate.” Comptroller of the Treasury of Md. v. Wynne, 135 S. Ct.
1787, 1802–04 (2015) (citing Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514
U.S. 175, 185 (1995)).
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When a law discriminates in its purpose or has a significant
discriminatory effect, reviewing courts generally require a state
to demonstrate that it enacted the law for a legitimate, nonprotectionist purpose and that there are no less discriminatory
107
means that would advance this purpose.
Nondiscriminatory laws that impose only an incidental effect on interstate commerce are subject to a balancing test
(known as “Pike balancing”), which would uphold the law unless a challenger can prove that the “burden imposed on [interstate] commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative
108
local benefits.” By not requiring a least restrictive alternative, by its very nature this is a much more deferential standard of review—perhaps more akin to rational basis review.
Still, over the years Pike balancing has been used by the Court
to reject multiple initiatives, including an Iowa law that limited
the length of double semi-trailers on interstate highways based
on what the Court cited as an “illusory” claim to safety benefits
109
by the state. Nevertheless, it has been more than 25 years
since the Supreme Court has invalidated a state law based on
Pike balancing. The Roberts Court has not rejected this strand
of dormant Commerce Clause doctrine, but its opinions show
some wariness regarding the judiciary’s institutional capacity
to engage in this kind of judicial review—primarily out of fear
that courts will overstep in weighing the costs and benefits of
110
state regulation. Lower courts, however, continue to see the
107. See, e.g., Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 270–71 (1984)
(invalidating a law that exempted local production of liquor and wine from a
20% excise tax on the grounds that this had no purpose other than to insulate
local producers from competition); Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617,
624–28 (1978) (applying “a virtually per se rule of invalidity” to explicit ban on
in-state disposal of out-of-state garbage); Hunt v. Wash. Apple Advert.
Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 352–53 (1977) (finding that a facially neutral law applying to apple distribution discriminated in effect against out-of-state apple
suppliers and was invalid); see also Cachia v. Islamorada, 542 F.3d 839, 842
(11th Cir. 2008) (finding unconstitutional a local ordinance that would have
prohibited chain retail establishments, such as a Starbucks coffee shop).
108. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
109. Kassel v. Consol. Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662 (1981); see also
Raymond Motor Transp., Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429 (1978) (invalidating similar
Wisconsin law).
110. See, e.g., Dep’t of Revenue of Ky. v. Davis, 553 U.S. 328, 353 (2008)
(refusing to apply Pike balancing and expressing skepticism about the use of
the judicial branch’s ability to balance the general costs and benefits of regulation); United Haulers Ass’n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550
U.S. 330, 347 (2007) (noting that a state law that favors a traditional government function but does not favor local private entities is not discriminatory,
and observing that finding otherwise would “reclaim that ground for judicial
supremacy under the banner of the dormant Commerce Clause”).
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Pike balancing approach as “deferential but not toothless,”
questioning or invalidating state or local laws when the alleged
112
local benefits are a pretext for discrimination or are trivial.
A third, and much more controversial, prong of dormant
Commerce Clause review prohibits “exterritorial regulation” by
prohibiting a state from attempting to control activities that oc113
cur entirely outside of its jurisdiction. Such laws are also subject to strict scrutiny but unlike laws that discriminate against
interstate commerce, if a law is deemed to constitute extraterritorial regulation, the state has no opportunity to attempt to
show there are no less discriminatory means to advance its le114
gitimate local purpose.
Although the Roberts Court has consistently favored fram111. See Colon Health Ctrs. of Am. v. Hazel, 733 F.3d 535, 545 (4th Cir.
2013) (citing Dep’t of Revenue of Ky., 533 U.S. at 339 (2008)).
112. Id. at 545–46 (holding that a district court erred in granting a motion
to dismiss challenging Virginia’s certificate of need law based on Pike balancing); Walgreen Co. v. Rullan, 405 F.3d 50, 59–60 (1st Cir. 2005) (invalidating a
facially neutral Puerto Rico law that required new pharmacies to obtain a certificate of convenience and necessity but exempted existing local pharmacies
and allowed them to object to proposed new pharmacy applications); Yamaha
Motor Corp., U.S.A. v. Jim’s Motorcycle, Inc., 401 F.3d 560, 569–74 (4th Cir.
2005) (invalidating a Virginia law that limited the ability of motorcycle manufacturers to open new dealerships in the state); Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Cal.
Pub. Util. Comm’n, 346 F.3d 851, 870–72 (9th Cir. 2003) (invalidating a California regulation that implemented performance standards for railroad companies); McNeilus Truck & Mfg., Inc. v. Ohio, 226 F.3d 429, 444 (6th Cir.
2000) (finding that an Ohio motor vehicle licensing dealer statute, which failed
strict scrutiny, also would fail Pike balancing, because the burden it imposes is
clearly excessive in relation to any local benefits); Medigen of Ky., Inc. v. Pub.
Serv. Co. of W. Va., 985 F.2d 164, 166–67 (4th Cir. 1992) (invalidating a West
Virginia medical waste transport certification requirement under Pike balancing, noting that restricting market entry does not advance consumer protection or reasonable service goals, and that a state cannot deny an applicant certification solely on the ground that “the area it seeks to serve already has
reasonably efficient and adequate service”).
113. See, e.g., Midwest Title Loans, Inc. v. Mills, 593 F.3d 660, 668–69 (7th
Cir. 2010) (invalidating state’s application of its consumer protection code to
an out-of-state lender). The extraterritorial doctrine finds root in Baldwin v.
G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511 (1935). As one court notes, however, it is not
clear that this is “really a distinct line of dormant commerce clause jurisprudence at all.” Instead, “one might see Baldwin and its progeny as no more
than instantiations of the Philadelphia anti-discrimination rule.” Energy &
Envtl. Legal Inst. v. Epel, 793 F.3d 1169, 1173 (10th Cir. 2015). For criticism
of the extraterritorial doctrine, see Brannon P. Denning, Extraterritoriality
and the Dormant Commerce Clause: A Doctrinal Post-Mortem, 73 LA. L. REV.
979 (2013); see also Alexandra B. Klass & Elizabeth Henley, Energy Policy,
Extraterritoriality and the Dormant Commerce Clause, 5 SAN DIEGO J. CLIMATE & ENERGY L. 127 (2013–14).
114. See Am. Beverage Ass’n v. Snyder, 735 F.3d 362, 381–82 (6th Cir.
2013) (Rice, J. concurring).
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ing its own approach to dormant Commerce Clause review to
focus on facially discriminatory laws or those that discriminate
significantly in purpose or effect, rather than evaluating the
other two strands of the dormant Commerce Clause, all three
tests remain valid approaches and are used routinely in assessing the constitutionality of state regulation of energy markets. These doctrines have particularly important implications
for state regulations that ban or limit access to markets, such
as certificates of need, as well as to differential regulations and
fees that states routinely impose on energy firms.
1. Market Bans
There is little doubt that there are clear instances in energy markets where states can go too far in treating out-of-state
suppliers differently in an interstate market. Outright bans on
the export or import of energy from particular sources are the
most obviously suspect. For example, in New England Power
Co. v. New Hampshire, the Supreme Court struck down a New
Hampshire regulation that prohibited the export of hydroelectric power produced in the state, noting the obviously discrimi115
natory effect this has on interstate commerce. Such bans
may, in limited circumstances, be justified where a state has no
other options to achieve an important environmental objective.
The Court upheld a Maine statute that prohibited imports of
live baitfish because of the parasite threat to Maine fisheries in
116
Maine v. Taylor. Maine, the Court observed, is under no obligation under the Commerce Clause “to sit idly by and wait until potentially irreversible environmental damage has occurred
or until the scientific community agrees on what disease organisms are and are not dangerous before it acts to avoid such con117
sequences.” As the Court reasoned, “[t]his is not a case of arbitrary discrimination against interstate commerce; the record
suggests that Maine has legitimate reasons, ‘apart from their
118
origin, to treat [out-of-state baitfish] differently.’”
Short of outright bans, the Supreme Court has invalidated
state certificate of need requirements (requiring preapproval by
regulators to participate in the market) where these lack a legitimate, non-protectionist rationale and effectuate an obstacle
115. New England Power Co. v. New Hampshire, 445 U.S. 331 (1982).
116. Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131 (1986).
117. Id. at 148 (quoting U.S. v. Taylor, 585 F. Supp. 393, 397 (D. Me.
1984)).
118. Id. at 151–52 (citing City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617,
627 (1978)).
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to interstate commerce by denying access to the market. Buck
v. Kuykendall rejected a Washington statute that prohibited
common carriers from using public highways in the state with119
out a certificate of need. There Justice Brandeis observed:
[The statute’s] primary purpose is not regulation with a view to safety
or to conservation of the highways, but the prohibition of competition.
It determines not the manner of use, but the persons by whom the
highways may be used. It prohibits such use to some persons while
permitting it to others for the same purpose and in the same man120
ner.

With a nod to federal preemption the Court observed that this
“also defeats the purpose of Congress expressed in the legislation giving federal aid for the construction of interstate high121
ways” —though the same day the Court also held unconstitutional a Maryland statute governing highways with no federal
122
funding.
Even a facially neutral licensing scheme can have a similar
discriminatory effect to a ban and raise dormant Commerce
Clause concerns under this line of cases. Such a program can
effectuate significant discrimination against interstate commerce even if out-of-state firms are allowed to apply. To take
one example, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit rejected a motor vehicle dealer-licensing program that gave established local interests the ability to block licensing of out-ofstate dealers by refusing to contract with them for warranty
123
services. This illustrates how even if a law is facially neutral,
where there is a discriminatory effect a state needs to justify its
regulatory program and to establish that there is no less restrictive alternative that can achieve the same regulatory pur124
poses.
119. Buck v. Kuykendall, 267 U.S. 307 (1925).
120. Id. at 315–16.
121. Id. at 316.
122. George W. Bush & Sons Co. v. Maloy, 267 U.S. 317, 324–25 (1925)
(holding a similar Maryland statute unconstitutional, even though the highways at issue were not constructed or improved with any federal aid, on the
grounds that it is clear that “the purpose of Congress is that the state highways shall be open to interstate commerce”). A summary of multiple cases
reaching a similar result in the transportation context appears in Medigen of
Kentucky, Inc. v. Public Service Comm’n of West Virginia, 787 F. Supp. 590,
597 (S.D.W.V. 1991).
123. McNeilus Truck & Mfg. Inc., v. Ohio, 226 F.3d 429, 444 (6th Cir.
2000).
124. As the Sixth Circuit noted, such program also may fail Pike balancing.
Id. at 444. Indeed, under Pike, licensing programs that restrict market entry
and favor incumbents have been struck down by federal appellate courts, despite state claims to some benefits to consumers. See, e.g., Walgreen Co. v.
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2. Discriminatory Regulations and Fees
In addition to state regulatory bans or licensing programs
that serve as a barrier to entry from out-of-state firms operating in that state’s market in the first instance, programs that
impose differential regulations or fees on out-of-state sources of
energy also have been challenged under dormant Commerce
Clause doctrine. In Wyoming v. Oklahoma, the Supreme Court
struck down an Oklahoma law requiring coal-fired power
plants located in the state to burn at least ten percent Oklaho125
ma-mined coal. The Court determined that the statute discriminated against interstate commerce “on its face” because it
“expressly reserve[d] a segment of the Oklahoma coal market
for Oklahoma-mined coal, to the exclusion of coal mined in oth126
er States.”
Not every regulation or fee is facially discriminatory, and
many will require a more nuanced analysis—as the Supreme
Court has recognized. In C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of
Clarkstown, the Court invalidated a municipally imposed monopoly over non-recyclable solid waste collected for processing
127
and transfer. To guarantee a minimum stream of revenues
for the project, the Town of Clarkstown, New York adopted a
flow control ordinance, allowing the private operator of a transfer station to collect a fee of $81 per ton, which was higher than
the disposal cost of solid waste in the private market. C & A
Carbone, Inc. processed solid waste and operated a recycling
center, as it was permitted to do under the Clarkstown flow
control ordinance. The flow control ordinance required companies like Carbone to bring non-recyclable waste to the locally
franchised transfer station and to pay a fee, while prohibiting
them from shipping the waste themselves. “[A] financing
measure,” the flow control ordinance ensured that “the townsponsored facility will be profitable, so that the local contractor
can build it and Clarkstown can buy it back at nominal cost in
Rullan, 405 F.3d 50, 59–60 (1st Cir. 2005) (invalidating a facially neutral
Puerto Rico law requiring new pharmacies to obtain a certificate of convenience and necessity, but exempting existing local pharmacies and allowing
them to object to proposed new pharmacy applications); Medigen of Ky., Inc.,
985 F.2d at 167 (invalidating a West Virginia medical waste transport certification requirement under Pike balancing, noting that restricting market entry
does not advance consumer protection or reasonable service goals and that a
state cannot deny an applicant certification “solely on the ground that the area
it seeks to serve already has reasonably efficient and adequate service”).
125. Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437, 461 (1992).
126. Id. at 455.
127. C & A Carbone, Inc., v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 394–95
(1994).
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five years.” The Court reasoned that the local law violated the
dormant Commerce Clause because in “practical effect and design” it bars out-of-state sanitary landfill operators from partic129
ipating in the local market for solid waste disposal.
Differential taxes and fees are especially vulnerable under
dormant Commerce Clause principles where, as in Carbone,
fees serve to benefit local industry at the expense of out-of-state
firms. For example, New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach invalidated a state tax credit that was designed to promote in-state
130
renewable fuels. Ohio argued that its law was designed to encourage other states to grant similar tax benefits to stimulate
the interstate sale of ethanol. The Court, however, rejected these arguments in favor of interstate coordination, found the law
discriminated on its face, and characterized the main purpose
of the Ohio statute as “favorable tax treatment for Ohio131
produced ethanol.”
These cases hinge not only on whether a fee is imposed on
out-of-state firms, but also on whether a specific in-state industry stands to benefit from the particular regulation or fee. In
West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, the Court invalidated a
subsidy for in-state dairy farmers funded through a tax on both
132
the out-of-state and in-state milk industry. The tax was not
paid into the state’s general funds, but went directly into a spe133
cial fund from which only in-state farmers received subsidies.
Yet not all taxes are structured in this manner, and separating
the tax aspect of a burden on out-of-state suppliers from the
subsidy that benefits in-state firms can help a program to sur134
vive. For example, in General Motors v. Tracy, the Court
evaluated Ohio’s differential tax burdens for in-state and outof-state natural gas suppliers, but refused to find a dormant
Commerce Clause violation on the particular facts that had
135
been raised.
128. Id. at 393.
129. Id. at 389, 394.
130. New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 279–80 (1988).
131. Id. at 279.
132. West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 206–07 (1994).
133. Id. at 188.
134. 519 U.S. 278, 280–81 (1997).
135. General Motors, which mounted a legal challenge to Ohio’s differential
tax, was a large enough customer to purchase its gas from the open market
(rendered competitive by national regulators) rather than bundled gas from a
state-regulated regulated gas distribution company. However, absent competition between the local company purchasing gas and the open market serving
General Motors, the Court reasoned, “there can be no local preference, whether by express discrimination against interstate commerce or undue burden up-
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B. STATE CLIMATE INITIATIVES AND DORMANT COMMERCE
CLAUSE DOCTRINE
Recent cases involving dormant Commerce Clause challenges to state renewable energy programs and other climate
initiatives indicate the doctrine’s continued relevance—
including for efforts to build out new energy infrastructure
such as transmission lines. More than 30 states have adopted
renewable portfolio standards (RPSs), requiring that a certain
percentage of electricity sold to customers be supplied from re136
newable sources of power. Although there is nothing constitutionally suspect about encouraging or even requiring renewable
energy, some particular aspects of RPS standards have raised
dormant Commerce Clause concerns. For example, some of these state RPS requirements have “in-region” or “in-state” restrictions on power generation; some have special “multipliers”
that favor in-state sources; and many are coupled with tax sub137
sidies favoring in-state sources. Some states also differ in
how they allow the trading of renewable energy credits in in138
terstate commerce. Steven Ferrey has sounded a consistent
alarm that such initiatives may violate the dormant Commerce
Clause. As he argues, “state renewable energy programs that
discriminate against power in interstate commerce bear some
resemblance to earlier discriminatory programs that states set
139
up for giving preference to in-state dairy and other interests.”
He is not without company on the judiciary. Judge Richard
Posner has also raised specific concerns about some RPS requirements, suggesting (albeit in dictum) that “Michigan cannot, without violating the commerce clause of Article I of the
Constitution, discriminate against out-of-state renewable eneron it, to which the dormant Commerce Clause may apply.” Id. at 301.
136. DAVIES ET AL., supra note 47, at 484–87 (describing RPSs); Renewable
Portfolio Standard Policies, DATABASE OF STATE INCENTIVES FOR RENEWABLES & EFFICIENCY (June 2015), http://ncsolarcen-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/
wp-content/uploads/2014/11/Renewable-Portfolio-Standards.pdf. Some of these
state laws set voluntary goals rather than mandatory requirements. See
DAVIES ET AL., supra note 47, at 484–87.
137. For a summary of some of these provisions, see Brannon Denning, Environmental Federalism and State Renewable Portfolio Standards, 64 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 1520 (2014).
138. See Daniel K. Lee & Timothy Duane, Putting the Dormant Commerce
Clause Back To Sleep: Adapting the Doctrine To Support State Renewable
Portfolio Standards, 43 ENVTL. L. 295, 317–18 (2013) (discussing Missouribundled REC requirement).
139. Steven Ferrey, Threading the Constitutional Needle with Care: The
Commerce Clause Threat to the New Infrastructure of Renewable Power, 7 TEX.
J. OIL GAS & ENERGY L. 60, 61 (2012); see also Ferrey, supra note 22, at 314–
19.
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140

gy.”

Despite these claims that some state RPS standards are
unconstitutional, to date federal appellate courts have not re141
jected any of the key features of state RPS standards. Although it did not involve an RPS standard, the most important
appellate court decision on the topic comes from the Ninth Cir142
cuit—Rocky Mountain Farmer’s Union v. Corey, a decision
that Brannon Denning has heralded as a “roadmap” for courts
considering dormant Commerce Clause challenges to state RPS
143
programs.
This case addressed, and ultimately upheld, a state renewable fuel requirement that, like RPS standards, regulates how
energy sold in the state is produced—even if that energy is produced elsewhere. In 2009, California adopted a low-carbon fuel
standard as a part of its Global Warming Solutions Act (AB 32),
which aimed to reduce California’s greenhouse gas (GHG)
emissions to 1990 levels by 2020. To comply with the cap, fuel
producers who wish to sell fuel in California are required to either meet a specific carbon intensity requirement or to pur144
chase credits offsetting their fuel’s higher carbon content. The
California fuel standard calculates the carbon intensity of a
particular fuel based on its life-cycle carbon content—i.e., not
only the carbon produced by burning the fuel, but also the carbon associated with producing the fuel and transporting it to
145
California. In a dormant Commerce Clause challenge brought
by Midwestern ethanol producers, a federal district court determined that factoring in the distance a fuel travels from production source to California in determining carbon content facially discriminates against out-of-state ethanol producers and
constitutes extraterritorial regulation in violation of the

140. Ill. Commerce Comm’n v. FERC, 721 F.3d 764, 776 (7th Cir. 2013).
141. See Denning, supra note 137 (discussing how constitutional doctrines
could limit state environmental initiatives); Ferrey, supra note 139, at 97; Lee
& Duane, supra note 138, at 298.
142. Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, 730 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir.
2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 2875 (2014).
143. Denning, supra note 137, at 1547.
144. See Rocky Mountain, 730 F.3d at 1085.
145. CA AIR RES. BD., ESTABLISHING NEW FUEL PATHWAYS UNDER THE
CALIFORNIA LOW CARBON FUEL STANDARD: PROCEDURES AND GUIDELINES
FOR REGULATED PARTIES AND FUEL PROVIDERS, 1 (Aug. 2, 2010), http://
www.arb.ca.gov/fuels/lcfs/122310-new-pathways-guid.pdf. Carbon Intensity
values are calculated by a standard greenhouse gas emissions equation
(gCO2e/MJ is the unit of measurement), which provides total greenhouse gas
emissions on a CO2 equivalent basis per unit of energy for a fuel.
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146

dormant Commerce Clause.
In Rocky Mountain, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s decision that the California fuel standard discriminates against interstate com147
merce and violates the extraterritoriality doctrine. The court
of appeals reasoned that a law is not discriminatory simply because it has unequal effects on in-state and out-of-state inter148
ests. Instead, the question is whether California’s decision to
assign different values to ethanol from different locations was
based solely on origin or whether there was “some reason, apart
149
from their origin to treat them differently.” If the California
fuel standard imposes higher costs on Midwestern ethanol by
virtue of its greater GHG emissions, there is a nondiscrimina150
tory reason for the higher carbon impact. The court noted
that California could not successfully promote low carbonintensity fuels and decrease GHG emissions associated with
those fuels if it ignored the real factors behind GHG emissions,
which include transportation and source of electricity used to
151
produce the ethanol. As the court noted, “[t]he Fuel Standard
does not isolate California and protect its producers from com152
petition.” The court ended its discussion of facial discrimination by declaring that its conclusion “is reinforced by the grave
need in this context for state experimentation” to address increasing GHG emissions and its potentially disastrous conse153
quences.
The court of appeals also rejected the argument that the
California fuel standard constitutes extraterritorial regulation
154
in violation of dormant Commerce Clause doctrine. Instead,
“[t]he Fuel Standard,” the court wrote, “regulates only the Cali155
fornia market.” As the court observed:
It says nothing at all about ethanol produced, sold, and used outside
California, it does not require other jurisdictions to adopt reciprocal
standards before their ethanol can be sold in California, it makes no

146. Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Goldstene, 843 F. Supp. 2d 1042
(E.D. Cal. 2011).
147. Rocky Mountain, 730 F.3d at 1077.
148. Id. at 1089.
149. Id. (quoting City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 627
(1978)).
150. Id. at 1089–90.
151. Id. at 1090.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 1097.
154. Id. at 1101.
155. Id.
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effort to ensure the price of ethanol is lower in California than in other states, and it imposes no civil or criminal penalties on non156
compliant transactions completed wholly out of state.

Even though states may not require compliance with their
laws in wholly out-of-state transactions, the court observed,
“they are free to regulate commerce and contracts within their
boundaries with the goal of influencing out-of-state choices of
157
market participants.” The court of appeals directed the district court to determine on remand whether the challenged fuel
standard provisions discriminate in purpose or effect and, if
158
not, to apply the Pike balancing test.
The Rocky Mountain decision does not mean that every
state climate initiative or RPS standard will survive a dormant
Commerce Clause challenge. Indeed, challenges will continue
to be brought and some of these are having an impact on state
regulatory initiatives. As in Rocky Mountain, there are a number of pending and recent cases that involve out-of-state energy
producers mounting challenges to state energy policy and climate change initiatives. To take one example, a challenge to
the Massachusetts RPS requirement that companies “enter into
cost effective long-term contracts to facilitate the financing of
renewable energy generation within the jurisdictional bounda159
ries of the commonwealth,” led Massachusetts to drop the instate requirement for long-term renewable energy contracts
160
and to remove locational requirements in its RPS. Although
not an RPS case, a district court in Minnesota invalidated Minnesota’s ban on use of new coal-fired power in the state in 2014
based on the somewhat controversial “extraterritoriality” prong
of dormant Commerce Clause doctrine, with potential implication for other state climate policies that may impact interstate
161
energy transactions. But in 2015, the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Tenth Circuit upheld Colorado’s facially neutral RPS in
response to a dormant Commerce Clause challenge alleging
that the law adversely impacted coal interests outside the state
162
and regulated extraterritorially.
The continued vitality of
156. Id. at 1102–03.
157. Id. at 1103.
158. Id. at 1107.
159. An Act Relative to Green Communities, ch. 169, § 83, 2008 Mass. Acts
308, 365; 220 MASS. CODE REGS. § 17.01 (2010).
160. See Partial Settlement Agreement, TransCanada Power Mktg. Ltd. v.
Bowels, No. 4:10-cv-40070 (D. Mass. 2010).
161. North Dakota v. Heydinger, 15 F. Supp. 3d 891, 910–11 (D. Minn.
2014).
162. Energy & Envtl. Legal Inst. v. Epel, 793 F.3d 1169, 1173–74 (10th Cir.
2015) (upholding Colorado RPS against a dormant Commerce Clause chal-
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these lower court challenges underscores the importance of
courts applying consistent principles as they evaluate state
climate initiatives under dormant Commerce Clause doctrine.
C. REVITALIZING DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE REVIEW FOR
INTERSTATE COORDINATION
These kinds of recent applications of dormant Commerce
Clause review, along with tepid applications of the doctrine by
the Roberts Court, underscore a need to revisit its first principles. Courts frequently described the basic animating principle
of dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence as the protection
against discrimination between in-state and out-of-state com163
petitors in interstate markets. In General Motors v. Tracy, for
example, Justice Souter, writing for the Court, stated, “[t]he
dormant commerce clause protects markets and participants in
164
markets, not taxpayers as such.” Justice Cardozo once described the doctrine as protecting “competition between the
165
states.” Such claims appear to embrace a pro-market stance
or to even require competition between states. Taken to an extreme, such a view of dormant Commerce Clause principles disfavors government intervention in economic markets, viewing
the primary role of federal courts as protecting states from interfering with the economic exchange of a free market econo166
my. In addition to reinforcing a neoclassical economics understanding of competitive markets, which would general favor
market initiatives over regulation, such a view values federallenge).
163. See Paul E. McGreal, The Flawed Economics of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1191, 1223 (1998).
164. General Motors v. Tracy, 519 U.S. 278, 300 (1997). Justice Souter bolstered this vision of the dormant Commerce Clause by referencing the famous
words of Justice Jackson:
Our system, fostered by the Commerce Clause, is that every farmer
and every craftsman shall be encouraged to produce by the certainty
that he will have free access to every market in the Nation, that no
home embargoes will withhold his exports, and no foreign state will
by customs duties or regulations exclude them. Likewise, every consumer may look to the free competition from every producing area in
the Nation to protect him from exploitation by any. Such was the vision of the Founders; such has been the doctrine of this Court which
has given it reality.
Id. at 299 (quoting H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 539
(1949)).
165. Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 522 (1935).
166. See Julian N. Eule, Laying the Dormant Commerce Clause to Rest, 91
YALE L.J. 425, 437–43 (1982); Steven G. Gey, The Political Economy of the
Dormant Commerce Clause, 17 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 1, 75–77 (1989–
90); McGreal, supra note 163.
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ism primarily for encouraging state experimentation because it
promotes competition between states for citizens and economic
capital.
It would be a mistake, however, to understand dormant
Commerce Clause principles as endorsing a constitutional preference for private markets, requiring competitive markets, or
mandating competition between states. To begin, dormant
Commerce Clause jurisprudence certainly does not disfavor
government regulation over markets. Indeed, despite Justice
Souter’s rhetoric preferring competitive markets in Tracy, there
the Court appeared to carve out a safe harbor favoring state
167
regulation of natural gas distribution. Established dormant
Commerce Clause doctrine suggests that when the state itself
takes on the role of market participant it is exempt from the
doctrine. For example, if a municipal government itself had
built and owned the facility in Carbone, this would bring the
monopoly within what is known as “the market-participant ex168
ception,” allowing an otherwise discriminatory state regime
to continue to operate without constitutional challenge.
In fact, states regulate and protect monopolies all the time
and provide advantages to them—such as subsidies, belowmarket interest rates from non-taxable bonds, bypassing state
or local restrictions on use of municipal tax powers, etc.—as a
way of providing incentives for investment in capital, such as
infrastructure. For example, municipal governments often help
to pay for privately operated infrastructure (such as waste disposal facilities) through the issuance of public bonds. It is understandable that a local government would want to create a
monopoly for firms operating such infrastructure, to help ensure that the operator maintains sufficient revenues to cover
its costs and to avoid jeopardizing the government’s bond rating. Such facilities are allowed to collect charges in regulated
rates and fees, which can serve the same basic function as a
167. Tracy, 519 U.S. at 278.
168. Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 440 (1980); Hughes v. Alexandria
Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 806 (1976). While many have criticized this exemption to dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence, it is defended as a pragmatic
balance between competing federalism concerns. See Dan T. Coenen, Untangling the Market-Participant Exception to the Dormant Commerce Clause, 88
MICH. L. REV. 395 (1989) (discussing and exploring the market-participant exception). The exemption is limited, and is not automatically available where
the state could expand into the market; to avail itself of the exemption the
state must establish that it is a market participant and may not use mere contractual privity to immunize downstream regulatory conduct in a market in
which it is not a direct participant. South-Central Timber Dev., Inc. v.
Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 97–98 (1984).
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tax. If the government itself were to build, own, and operate a
facility, the political process would impose a general tax; however, with private operations subsidized by a state or locally enforced private utility, the tax implications of such projects are
more obscured.
One way of understanding the Court’s rejection of the
Clarkstown flow control ordinance in Carbone is based on its
concerns with impermissible government-aided private monopolies. The Town of Clarkstown, New York, for example, guaranteed revenue for its solid waste transfer station—it promised a
minimum of 120,000 tons of waste per year, allowing the firm
to make more than $9.7 million in annual revenue—and, after
169
a period of five years, the town agreed to buy it for $1.
Dormant Commerce Clause doctrine allows substantial state
government intervention in the setting of prices, subsidies, and
taxes, so long as a state does not engage in differential treatment in the same market in ways that burden interstate competition.
Moreover, since dormant Commerce Clause doctrine is not
derived from the express language of the U.S. Constitution,
Congress can adopt a national policy that preempts, or overrides, the competitive market between individual states—even
if this is not a free market policy. Under the Commerce Clause,
there is no doubt that Congress has the express authority to establish a federal agency such as the Interstate Commerce
Commission, giving it the jurisdiction to regulate railroad rates
previously left to individual states. There is also no doubt that
Congress could delegate significant authority over the siting of
interstate electric transmission lines to FERC, as it has done
for interstate natural gas pipelines. “Our Constitution,” the late
Julian Eule has written, “did not attempt to solve economic parochialism by an express prohibition against interference with
free trade. Instead, it shifted legislative power over economic
matters that affect more than one state to a single national
170
body.”
Nor do dormant Commerce Clause principles mandate
competition between states, as a neoclassical economic understanding of federalism would suggest. A number of other scholars have highlighted how requiring competition between states
171
is a flawed understanding of constitutional federalism. In169. C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 387 (1994).
170. Eule, supra note 166, at 430.
171. See id.; Gey, supra note 166, at 429–30; McGreal, supra note 163, at
1228.
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stead of requiring competition between states, the dormant
Commerce Clause is focused primarily on preserving or promoting reciprocity or coordination between subnational governments—to ensure that subnational regulation is not occurring
for the kinds of parochial or isolationist reasons that make interstate commerce impossible. Dormant Commerce Clause doctrine attempts to evaluate this by looking to the purposes behind subnational laws when they are adopted. These purposes
are not always clear, nor are they always singular in nature;
for example, a statute may have both protectionist and nonprotectionist motives.
A good proxy for evaluating whether parochialism and
nonreciprocal motivations, such as economic protectionism, are
driving a law is to consider the state or local political process
that leads to its adoption in the first place. In West Lynn
Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, the Supreme Court found unconstitutional a Massachusetts tax and rebate scheme for milk (even
where the tax operated neutrally without regard to the milk’s
place of origin) where tax revenue went into a subsidy fund and
172
was distributed solely to Massachusetts milk producers. As
Justice Stevens reasoned in his majority opinion striking down
this tax and subsidy regime:
Nondiscriminatory measures, like the evenhanded tax at issue here,
are generally upheld, in spite of any adverse effects on interstate
commerce, in part because “[t]he existence of major in-state interests
adversely affected . . . is a powerful safeguard against legislative
abuse.” However, when a nondiscriminatory tax is coupled with a
subsidy to one of the groups hurt by the tax, a State’s political processes can no longer be relied upon to prevent legislative abuse, because one of the in-state interests which would otherwise lobby
173
against the tax has been mollified by the subsidy.

In stark contrast to the neoclassical economics goal of
courts protecting markets and competition in dormant Commerce Clause review, this “political process approach” would
see courts as taking on more of a political process approach in
reviewing state and local laws. Rather than protecting competition or requiring competition between states, the purposes of
dormant Commerce Clause doctrine can be understood within
the framework of Madisonian democracy—specifically, limiting
narrow forms of interest group rent-seeking in the state or local
174
regulatory process. On this view, courts engaged in dormant
172. West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 194 (1994).
173. Id. at 200 (citing Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S.
456, 473 n.17 (1981), and other cases).
174. For a game-theory elaboration of this view, see Maxwell L. Stearns, A
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Commerce Clause review would play a representative-enforcing
role, in a manner similar to what is envisioned by Carolene
Products’ famous footnote four, which emphasizes using judicial doctrine interpreting the Constitution to improve the polit175
ical process. Unlike the traditional public choice critique,
which condemns all state and local rent-seeking, dormant
Commerce Clause review focused on political process concerns
would only target those rent-seeking laws that restrain commerce in ways that undermine reciprocity norms between
176
states.
As a practical matter, what does this alternative approach
mean for courts reviewing state siting or permitting plans under dormant Commerce Clause doctrine? We are sympathetic to
those (including members of the Roberts Court) who are concerned about how dormant Commerce Clause doctrine invites a
reviewing judge to sit as a super-legislature in balancing the
substantive costs and benefits of different state laws, especially
under Pike balancing. With this in mind, we do not propose
that a court reviewing state or local programs under the
dormant Commerce Clause always engage in strict scrutiny or
open-ended balancing of the costs and benefits of regulation.
However, we also do not believe that a reviewing court should
give a free pass under the dormant Commerce Clause simply
because a state claims neutrality in the treatment of regulated
firms—especially if a program has the effect of limiting market
entry to out-of-state firms. Nor do we believe it is appropriate
for a reviewing court to use Pike balancing to uphold a state
program that ignores the impacts on out-of-state firms, espeBeautiful Mend: A Game Theoretical Analysis of the Dormant Commerce
Clause Doctrine, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1 (2003).
175. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
John Hart Ely has famously applied the representation-reinforcing role of
Carolene Products to equal protection jurisprudence. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980).
176. The state political process allows states, like the U.S. Congress, to
adopt rent-seeking legislation, in the form of regulation, subsidies, and taxes.
However, an individual state cannot use regulation to foreclose an interstate
market or tie taxes and subsidies together to benefit in-state firms in a manner that undermines interstate competition. On this view, some rent transfers
are permissible, if not desirable, in state and local political processes. For example, rent-seeking in the form of a neutral corporate tax exemption for utilities, or rent-seeking in the setting of utility rates to favor industrial growth, is
likely permissible, and subject only to the safeguards of the local political process. However, rent-seeking in the form of exclusionary regulation that limits
access to the interstate market is more suspect as an approach to regulating
economic matters, especially where market exchange is the background norm
as a matter of national policy.
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cially when the affected stakeholders have no recourse at all in
the state or local jurisdiction’s political process.
At a minimum, if a law does discriminate on its face, the
burden is on a state to show some legitimate regulatory purpose beyond protecting incumbent firms and that there is no
less restrictive regulatory alternative. Laws that restrict market entry, such as limits on licensing and permitting, must be
evaluated for their discriminatory effects and challengers
should be allowed to present evidence of the impact of a permitting or eminent domain regime on interstate markets. Where
there is a significant burden on interstate commerce, such laws
cannot be justified solely by making reference to protecting reliability or prices for in-state consumers. Instead, the assertion
of justifications by states must occur with a decision-making
framework that, at a minimum, shows some opportunity for the
consideration of out-of-state benefits. As states or localities explain how regulatory actions and legislation restricting power
supply in the wholesale market or transmission expansion
might serve legitimate purposes, such as environmental or consumer protection, courts need to play some role in evaluating
these claims to benefits, especially where affected interests
lacked any voice or opportunity for participation in the state
political or regulatory process.
Although this is a fact-bound inquiry, whether a court invokes either strict scrutiny or more deferential Pike balancing,
it is not appropriate for a court itself to assess whether, based
on the weight of the evidence, the benefits of a state program
justify its costs. Rather, we believe that the tradeoffs made in
this balancing must ultimately occur in the state political process. The relevant factual inquiry for a reviewing court is
whether the state provided sufficient consideration of costs and
benefits of regulation in making its own tradeoffs in the political and regulatory process. Dormant Commerce Clause principles require that a state’s claim to benefits must be attentive to
the political process and to concerns about its impacts on interstate coordination. In order to ensure that a state’s claim to
benefits matches the lawmaking or regulatory process that led
to a decision in the first place, the benefits must be claimed in
the legislative or regulatory process, not merely asserted post
hoc in briefs filed before a reviewing court. Moreover, to ensure
that the legislative and regulatory process does not facilitate
further protectionism or thwart interstate coordination, federal
courts must play some role in evaluating the range of benefits
that has been considered by a state. Specifically, a state’s
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claims to benefits cannot be unduly narrow, and cannot be
based on a process or substantive choice that ignores out-ofstate benefits in making a regulatory choice—any more than a
state can ignore out-of-state harms in discriminating against
out-of-state firms. For strict scrutiny, this is relevant to assessing whether the benefits claimed by a state are legitimate,
as well as in comparing the restrictions of various alternative
regulatory approaches. In Pike balancing, where the burdens
are only incidental, the Supreme Court has recognized the danger of a state making “illusory” claims to benefits where the
broader effects of its regulations outside of its jurisdiction have
177
been ignored. States can best overcome concerns with illusory
benefits by ensuring their law making and regulatory processes
contemporaneously provide for some mechanism, either procedurally or in substance, for it to consider out-of-state as well as
in-state concerns.
To take an example, in the Carbone case, the Town of
Clarkstown promised to make up losses from operating the
transfer facility at competitive rates, presumably by taking
178
these losses out of its general revenues. Even if the town imposes the same monopoly and fees on both in- and out-of-state
providers of service, the result of upholding it would be to allow
a local government to take money from the public fisc to effectively indemnify a private monopoly’s investors. As the Court
held in Carbone, dormant Commerce Clause doctrine prohibits
this, especially where it significantly burdens the interstate
market without allowing those who are potentially most affected any opportunity for consideration in the state regulatory
179
process. Such a program may be upheld, in our view, but only
if it provides some reasons contemporaneous with its enactment that show the town made some effort to consider the
broader benefits of the program and made a decision to use
177. See, e.g., Kassel v. Consol. Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662, 670–71
(1981) (“The State’s [purported] safety interest has been found to be illusory,
and its regulations impair significantly the federal interest in efficient and
safe interstate transportation.”).
178. C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 387 (1994).
179. Further, as in Carbone, authorizing above-market fees solely for purposes of maintaining a private monopoly is especially suspect. As we move
from local to state monopoly franchises, concerns with a single firm capturing
the political process are perhaps weaker—a single firm that dominates municipal politics may have little power in statewide regulatory and political processes. State-franchised monopolies may be more likely to pass constitutional
muster, but even neutral financing arrangements may be suspect if they favor
local enterprise and have the “practical effect and design” of impeding out-ofstate competitors.
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public money to favor one monopolist over another for legitimate, and non-illusory, public reasons.
Paying attention to the political process and broader consideration of benefits in dormant Commerce Clause review is
not inconsistent with the approach of the Roberts Court. In
United Haulers Ass’n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Management Authority, the Court upheld a flow control ordinance
180
on a similar rationale. The Court reasoned that “the most
palpable harm imposed by the ordinances—more expensive
trash removal—is likely to fall upon the very people who voted
181
for the laws.” Echoing Justice Stevens’ political process rationale in West Lynn Creamery, Chief Justice Roberts’ plurality
opinion framed dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence as
protecting parties not effectively represented in the legislative
process:
Our dormant Commerce Clause cases often find discrimination when
a State shifts the costs of regulation to other States, because when
“the burden of state regulation falls on interests outside the state, it
is unlikely to be alleviated by the operation of those political restraints normally exerted when interests within the state are affect182
ed.”

However, Justice Roberts reasoned, when the burdened
out-of-state party was effectively represented by an in-state
party, there was “no reason to step in and hand local businesses a victory they could not obtain through the political pro183
cess.” After finding no facial discrimination against interstate
commerce, Justice Roberts’ opinion also suggested that the law
in question was not invalid under the Pike balancing test, relying on the “significant health and environmental benefits” con184
ferred on county citizens from the county processing facility.
According to Justice Roberts, the ordinance “conferr[ed] significant health and environmental benefits upon the citizens of the
Counties” by not charging for many recycling services, producing incentives for recycling and taking responsibility for disposal of hazardous waste by routing all recyclables through one
185
facility.
180. United Haulers Ass’n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth.,
550 U.S. 330 (2007).
181. Id. at 345.
182. Id. (quoting S. Pac. Co. v. Arizona ex rel. Sullivan, 325 U.S. 761, 767–
68 n.2 (1945)).
183. Id.
184. Id. at 346–47.
185. Id. A majority of the Justices did not join the part of the opinion that
would have upheld the law under Pike balancing (Justices Scalia and Thomas,
in particular, rejected the Pike analysis as a basis for dormant Commerce
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Understood in a similar manner, recent appellate court
cases applying dormant Commerce Clause review to state renewable energy initiatives such as Rocky Mountain may be said
to reinforce two important federalism principles. One principle
is promoting state experimentation in financing clean energy
innovations and firms to advance a variety of state goals, including job creation and environmental objectives related to
addressing climate change. Such tradeoffs, if made in a state
political process, are subject to considerable deference. The
Ninth Circuit panel in Rocky Mountain observed that a few
other states were considering similar legislation but that “[i]f
we were to invalidate regulation every time another state considered a complementary statute, we would destroy the states’
186
ability to experiment with regulation.” The court concluded
its discussion by stating that California “should be encouraged
to continue and to expand its efforts to find a workable solution
187
to lower carbon emissions, or to slow their rise.” Of course, at
the extreme, programs that in fact attempt to regulate extraterritorial conduct may be suspect, as are programs that discriminate on their face to foreclose any opportunities for out-ofstate suppliers. In each of these cases, neither of the groups
bearing the primary burden has any representation in the political process. Even still, as long as a state can justify differential treatments of in- and out-of-state suppliers in terms of
some legitimate, non-protectionist goal, such as promoting energy reliability or sustainability or reducing carbon emissions
to address climate change, discriminatory treatment can be justified.
An equally important principle that Rocky Mountain recognizes is how the consideration of out-of-state benefits can
serve to justify a state’s initiatives under dormant Commerce
Clause principles. The consideration of such benefits (such as
the regional, national, or global benefits associated with addressing climate change) suggests that a state is choosing to
impose some costs on its own residents in order to promote
norms of cooperation among states. Promoting the kind of coordination that is required to address these goals is consistent
with federalism principles such as avoiding balkanization. And
Clause review). Despite this, it appears that a majority of the Justices still
would accept Pike balancing as an approach to reviewing a state law with only
incidental burden on interstate commerce—they just disagreed on application
to the United Haulers facts.
186. Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, 730 F.3d 1070, 1105 (9th
Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 2875 (2014).
187. Id. at 1107.
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it also is consistent with the political process view of dormant
Commerce Clause review endorsed by Justice Stevens, and
more recently, the Roberts Court. Coordination in state policies, as reflected in energy market initiatives that take into account out-of-state benefits, is certainly allowed under dormant
Commerce Clause doctrine. Indeed, we maintain that it ought
to be encouraged and, in some instances, required. When a
state does consider these kinds of benefits in making distinctions, it seems unlikely that such laws can be said to facially
discriminate against out-of-state firms, as long as those firms
are not foreclosed altogether from participating in the market.
At the very minimum, a legislative record endorsing these
kinds of interstate coordination benefits should be considered a
“plus” factor in both Pike balancing and in assessing a legitimate state purpose or comparing a least restrictive alternative
pursuant to strict scrutiny review.
The converse also follows. Where there is conflicting evidence of legislative motive, a lack of any initiative on the part
of a state to take into account broader interstate goals should
be reason for a court to pause and question whether the law is
justified. When facing a dormant Commerce Clause challenge
to a state initiative, if a state fails to present any evidence of
legislative motive a state should not be able to use silence or
ambiguity to justify laws that have a discriminatory purpose or
effect. This does not mean every state law that is silent or ambiguous about motive will fail or be subject to scrutiny; laws
that, on their face, do not discriminate between in-state and
out-of-state interests are still subject to review under Pike balancing. Despite the generally deferential approach courts take
in evaluating initiatives under Pike balancing, where state
laws involve social initiatives that depend on interstate coordination to achieve their objectives, such silence may be reason
for serious judicial evaluation under dormant Commerce
Clause principles—if for no other reason than to encourage
public officials to provide better reasons for why programs need
to discriminate against those outside of a state.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL FLAWS WITH SITING AND
EMINENT DOMAIN REGIMES
By its very nature, interstate electric transmission line siting requires states to go beyond parochial concerns and recognize larger interstate benefits associated with approving
transmission lines. It is true that many states stand to benefit
from approving transmission lines—especially states that are
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consistently exporting or importing sources of power. States
producing a surplus of renewable energy in particular stand to
benefit economically from approving new lines. Many of these
states face no disincentive to approve new transmission lines—
and some of these states have even reformed their transmission
line siting procedures to recognize the particular benefits that
siting can produce. For instance, New Mexico has enacted legislation creating a state Renewable Energy Transmission Authority that is authorized to participate in regional transmission forums and has the power of eminent domain to acquire
188
property if needed for regional transmission projects. The
Wyoming legislature created the Wyoming Infrastructure Authority to, among other things, improve the state’s electricity
transmission infrastructure and to facilitate the consumption of
Wyoming energy, and authorizes the authority to use eminent
189
domain to accomplish its purposes. North Dakota, Idaho, and
Kansas have also created state agencies to address transmission planning and facilitate the export of both renewable and
nonrenewable energy resources generated in those states and
190
to address reliability concerns. Finally, Texas is able to engage in more streamlined transmission planning, siting and
eminent domain because unlike any other state, it has its own,
in-state grid and has significant wind and solar resources as
well as major population centers all within a single jurisdic191
tion.
For all these states, there are significant economic incentives to facilitate the siting of high-voltage, long distance electric transmission lines. All these states have significant renewable and nonrenewable energy resources, have vast amounts of
open space within their borders, rely heavily on energy exports
to support their economies, and have low electricity prices.
Texas has an incentive to transport its wind resources from
sparsely populated parts of the states to its cities and the other
states can export their surplus energy to other states for eco188. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 62-16A-4b(6) (2015) (allowing the state authority to
coordinate and plan with other states and entities for interstate transmission);
Id. at § 62-16A-4b(8) (providing that the state authority may exercise eminent
domain for projects).
189. WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 37-5-303(a), 304(a) (2015).
190. See Klass, Takings and Transmission, supra note 1, at 1142–43 (discussing state laws).
191. See Klass & Wilson, supra note 1, at 1843–47 (discussing Texas grid
and Texas PUC actions to facilitate transmission lines to connect wind resources to population centers through the state’s Competitive Renewable Energy Zone (CREZ) program).

2015] ENERGY AND DORMANT COMMERCE REVIEW

179

nomic gain. These states recognize that to meet all these goals
it is necessary to reduce barriers to the siting and construction
of long-distance transmission lines.
But not every state has similar incentives to approve new
lines. A state in the path of a proposed line that will not receive
or sell the electricity transported faces pressure to “hold out,”
because a new transmission line will not produce the same
benefits for its citizens as for citizens from neighboring states
seeking to import or export energy. These regulatory holdout
problems appear to occur regularly in transmission line
siting—at a minimum they lead to delays in the siting of new
lines (and in developers obtaining financing); at the extreme
they may lead proposals for new lines to be dropped altogether.
The holdout problem with transmission line siting is enabled
and encouraged by the legal structure of public utility and
property law in many states.
As we highlight in this Part, substantive and procedural
aspects of many state siting and eminent domain regimes enable the kinds of state holdout problems that can thwart coordination in energy markets. We maintain that dormant Commerce Clause doctrines and principles provide an appropriate
and powerful framework for challenging such laws and practices, and help to expose many of their constitutional deficiencies.
A. NARROW ASSESSMENT OF BENEFITS BY REGULATORS IN GRID
SITING DETERMINATIONS
In considering approval of transmission line applications, a
number of states limit the consideration of “need” in siting
192
transmission lines to in-state benefits. In such states, a narrow assessment of the benefits of a new line by regulators can
give rise to potential challenges under the dormant Commerce
Clause. States’ refusal to take into account any benefits that
extend beyond their own borders in considering applications for
interstate electric transmission lines are especially problematic
on the political process understanding of dormant Commerce
Clause doctrine, or on any understanding of its principles as focused on preserving or promoting interstate coordination.
Such challenges may occur where a state regulator refuses
to take into account any out-of-state or regional benefits associated with a transmission line. For example, in 2006, Southern
192. See, e.g., Brown & Rossi, supra note 1, at 721–27 (highlighting how
many state “need” statutes explicitly, in the criteria they require regulators to
consider, or implicitly, through incorporation of traditional state public utility
principles, limit the assessment of benefits to native load customers).
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California Edison proposed to build a 230-mile high voltage
transmission line from Blythe, California to the Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station, located fifty miles west of Phoenix,
193
194
Arizona. California regulators approved the line. However,
Arizona regulators rejected the proposal, even though Califor195
nia ratepayers would have paid for the project. One Arizona
regulator bluntly characterized the proposed line as a “230-mile
196
extension cord.” Another explained his opposition to the line:
“I don’t want Arizona to become an energy farm for California.
This project, if we approved it, would use our land, our air and
197
our water to provide electricity to California.”
Similarly, in 2015 the Missouri PUC denied a request by
198
Clean Line Energy Partners, a merchant transmission line
company, for a certificate of convenience and necessity for the
“Grain Belt Express” transmission line that would transport
199
wind energy through four states. Prior to the final decision,
the Missouri commissioners opposed to the project took the position that “the project wasn’t needed in the state and may not
200
have an immediate benefit to Missouri ratepayers.”
One
commissioner stated that “[m]y first thought was that I need to
193. So. Cal. Edison Co., No. 07-01-040, 7–8 (Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm’n Jan.
25, 2007) (granting a Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity); Press
Release, Heather Murphy, Public Information Officer, Ariz. Corp. Comm’n,
Regulators Reject “Extension Cord for California” (May 30, 2007), http://
www.azcc.gov/divisions/administration/news/Devers_II_Vote.pdf.
194. So. Cal. Edison Co., No. 07-01-040, at 112.
195. So. Cal. Edison Co., Case No. 130, Decision No. 69638, 1 (Ariz. Corp.
Comm’n June 6, 2007), http://images.edocket.azcc.gov/docketpdf/0000073735
.pdf (denying Certificate of Environmental Compatibility).
196. Murphy, supra note 193, at 1.
197. Id.
198. See CLEAN LINE ENERGY PARTNERS, http://www.cleanlineenergy.com
(last visited Oct. 16, 2015).
199. See Grain Belt Express Clean Line LLC, No. EA-2014-0207, 26–27
(Mo. Pub. Servs. Comm’n July 1, 2015), http://www.eenews.net/assets/2015/
07/02/document_ew_03.pdf (denying certificate of convenience and necessity
for Grain Belt Express); see also Jacob Barker, Mo. Regulators Face Hard
Choice over Renewable Energy Highway, ENRMIDWEST (June 14, 2015),
http://midwest.construction.com/yb/mw/article.aspx?story_id=id:GorCQj4HR0
BvDSmjfbOKWxV0Qz25cxq0TFY8CBI_pheOenKLw0cJhcIwM2g3iXj3
(discussing positions of various Missouri PUC commissioners and status of Grain
Belt Express in other states); Jeffrey Tomich, Clean Line Transmission Project
in Limbo After Mo. Rejection, ENERGYWIRE (July 2, 2015), http://www.eenews
.net/stories/1060021203 (reporting on Missouri PUC denial of certificate of
convenience and necessity for Grain Belt Express); Jeffrey Tomich, Clean Line
Transmission Project Gets Chilly Reception in Missouri, MIDWEST ENERGY
NEWS (Aug. 14, 2014), http://midwestenergynews.com/2014/08/14/clean-line
-transmission-project-gets-chilly-reception-in-missouri.
200. See Barker, supra note 199.

2015] ENERGY AND DORMANT COMMERCE REVIEW

181

201

look after Missourians first and go from there.”
If a dormant Commerce Clause challenge were brought to
Arizona’s or Missouri’s rejections of the proposed transmission
lines, we maintain that these would be likely cases for courts to
declare the actions of state regulators unconstitutional. In another infrastructure context, in Dakota & Minnesota Eastern
Railroad Corporation v. South Dakota, the U.S. District Court
for the District of South Dakota invalidated a state statute that
allowed the use of eminent domain for railroads in the state only for purposes of providing railroad transportation to shippers
in South Dakota, solely for commodities produced, mined,
grown or consumed in the state. The court found this to be a violation of dormant Commerce Clause doctrine, noting how the
law allows eminent domain “only” to benefit South Dakota interests rather than merely requiring that South Dakota inter202
ests “be on par with the interests of shippers in other states.”
Arizona’s and Missouri’s rejections of the proposed transmission lines raise similar constitutional concerns. Focusing
entirely on local costs and benefits, in a manner that fails to
consider any of the benefits outside of a state’s border, allows a
state to serve as a regulatory holdout for reasons that, in effect,
are parochial and even protectionist. A straightforward application of dormant Commerce Clause doctrine shows how this is
suspect. Such a scheme may be discriminatory on its face to the
extent that a legislature prohibits state regulators from taking
into account benefits to out-of-state producers and consumers
altogether. A siting statute that allows regulators discretion to
accept or reject a siting application based on their determinations of the costs and benefits allows regulators considerable
discretion to frame costs and benefits, and may not constitute
per se discrimination. However, even if such a regulatory
scheme is not facially discriminatory, it is clearly discriminatory in purpose and effect. In fact, discrimination against any
sales of Arizona produced power to California is exactly what
the Arizona regulator characterizing the line as an “extension
cord” intended. Likewise, the Missouri regulators denied the
line at least in part because of the lack of in-state benefits and
appeared to ignore the regional, out-of-state benefits.
Application of the more deferential Pike balancing test also
reinforces how Arizona’s and Missouri’s refusals to site the
201. Id.
202. Dakota, Minn. & E. R.R. Corp. v. South Dakota, 236 F. Supp. 2d 989,
1016 (D.S.D. 2002), aff’d in part, rev’d in part on other grounds, 362 F.3d 512
(8th Cir. 2004).
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transmission lines are susceptible to challenge, even if their actions impose only incidental burdens on interstate commerce.
Such a balancing test would weigh the costs of discriminating
against sales of power to other states against the benefits. In
the case of the Arizona line, the benefits of refusing to site the
line are not to Arizona ratepayers; the line would have been be
paid for by California customers. Perhaps Arizona sees the
benefits as losing its lowest cost power to California once the
transmission is built—the comments of the regulator hints that
this is the case. Notably, however, that benefit would make refusal to approve the line per se discriminatory insofar as it suggests that Arizona is prohibiting exports to keep the cheapest
203
cost energy within its borders. In its regulatory decision Arizona decided to characterize the benefits of refusing to approve
the line as primarily environmental, with respect to its potential impact on watershed, desert, wildlife, and archaeological
sites. This may justify discrimination under the Pike balancing
test. However, these benefits need to be placed explicitly in the
balance along with other benefits. To the extent Arizona downplayed or explicitly ignored any out-of-state benefits this should
be considered as negative factors in the weight of the evidence
regarding its justifications for refusing to approve the line.
Similar arguments apply to Missouri’s rejection of the Grain
Belt Express transmission line, to the extent state regulators
appear to have ignored the out-of-state, regional benefits, and
instead focused only on the alleged paucity of benefits for Missouri residents. The fact that this line was proposed by a merchant developer whose business model would not allow it to
serve Missouri retail customers makes the denial even more
constitutionally suspect, insofar as this appears to favor a
state’s incumbent utility developers over non-utility developers.
An approach to dormant Commerce Clause review that is
attentive to concerns about the political process preserving opportunities for interstate coordination would look with particular suspicion on a regulatory decision that was made based on
such limited consideration of the benefits. Arizona’s refusal to
site the proposed transmission line benefitted in-state interests—especially consumers who did not want to pay market
rates for electricity or producers who did not want to face new
203. See, e.g., New England Power Co. v. New Hampshire, 455 U.S. 331,
339 (1982) (“The order of the New Hampshire Commission, prohibiting New
England Power from selling its hydroelectric energy outside the State of New
Hampshire, is precisely the sort of protectionist regulation that the Commerce
Clause declares off-limits to the states.”).
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competition—but this also worked to harm interests (out-ofstate suppliers and consumers) who have little or no mechanism to participate in the political process that holds a state’s
regulators or politicians accountable. The Missouri regulators
also cited the lack of benefits to Missouri ratepayers as the reason for opposing the line without considering the wind generators and ratepayers in other states that would benefit. Such an
analysis seems to undermine the kinds of coordination benefits
reinforced by dormant Commerce Clause principles. Such benefits could be framed in terms of promoting grid reliability or in
terms of the climate change benefits associated with greater
deployment of renewable energy sources on the grid; but ignoring them altogether seems to border on the exact kind of discrimination that dormant Commerce Clause doctrine prohibits.
What seems most troubling is that there appears to be no evidence that Arizona and Missouri regulators even considered
these benefits or weighed them in making their final decisions.
B. WHITTLING DOWN “PUBLIC USE” AND EMINENT DOMAIN
POST-KELO
204

In Kelo v. City of New London, the Supreme Court held
that a city’s decision to take private property by eminent domain in connection with a private redevelopment project was a
“public use” under the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment,
based on the city’s determination that the project would reinvigorate the city core and increase its tax base. In finding this
“economic development taking” valid under the U.S. Constitution, the Kelo court emphasized that states could define public
use more restrictively in their state statutes or constitutions.
As the Court noted, “our public use jurisprudence has wisely
eschewed rigid formulas and intrusive scrutiny in favor of affording legislatures broad latitude in determining what public
205
needs justify the use of the takings power.”
More than half the states have revised their eminent domain laws to limit the economic development takings at issue
in the Kelo case itself and to more narrowly define what constitutes a “public use” for general eminent domain purposes—
206
primarily to expand protections for private property owners.
By whittling down the categories of “public use,” many of these
revisions are certain to make the exercise of eminent domain
authority to facilitate energy exports potentially more difficult.
204. 545 U.S. 469, 489 (2005).
205. Id. at 483.
206. See Klass, Takings and Transmission, supra note 1, at 1093–94.
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While many of the statutes states have enacted post-Kelo specifically provide that electric transmission lines or pipelines
remain a public use, others do not, creating the potential that
proposed projects that were once thought to be a classic public
use might not be when analyzed under a state’s post-Kelo legislation. Some states have in effect limited the ability to use eminent domain to authorize a “pass through” transmission line or
pipeline sponsored by an out-of-state applicant.
For instance, in 2013, the Missouri Supreme Court held in
207
Missouri ex rel. Jackson v. Dolan that a port authority could
not exercise eminent domain to build a “loop track” to accommodate larger train cars that would bring oil from the Bakken
shale area of North Dakota to the port area where the oil would
travel down the Mississippi River to refineries on the Gulf
208
Coast. In reaching its decision, the court recognized that Missouri had long ago adopted a broad interpretation of “public
use” but that post-Kelo state legislation prohibited all condemning authorities from acquiring property by eminent domain “for
209
solely economic development purposes.” Because the port authority had testified that the purpose for the taking was to
promote jobs and commerce through the use of the additional
rail facilities, the court found that the taking was solely for
economic development purposes and thus was contrary to the
210
state statute. Even though the port authority also testified
211
that the taking “would improve river commerce” the court
found that the only improvement to river commerce would be
212
by drawing more economic development to the area.
While the Jackson case involved a rail track linked to interstate river transport rather than an interstate electric
transmission line, it raises potential concerns for lines being
built in states with bans on economic development takings
where the purpose of the line is to export the state’s renewable
resources, which could be argued to promote economic development. Moreover, to the extent lines are being built in states
solely for reliability or energy export purposes, it is much easier
for landowners opposing the line to argue first, that there is no
207. 398 S.W.3d 472 (Mo. 2013) (en banc).
208. See David A. Lieb, Associated Press, Mo. Court Blocks Eminent Domain by SEMO Port Authority, SOUTHEAST MISSOURIAN (May 29, 2013),
http://www.semissourian.com/story/1973038.html.
209. Jackson, 398 S.W.3d at 478.
210. Id. at 481–82.
211. Id. at 480.
212. Id. at 481–82.
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in-state public use to justify the taking and, second, that bans
on economic development takings are an additional obstacle to
eminent domain. Indeed, even before Kelo, there were many
examples of state courts requiring significant local benefits in
order for an interstate electric transmission line to exercise eminent domain authority. The Mississippi Supreme Court in
1984, in Mississippi Power & Light Co. v. Conerly, refused to
allow the exercise of eminent domain authority for a highvoltage power line between Mississippi and Louisiana because
“the terms ‘public necessity’ and ‘public use’ . . . contemplate
use by the citizens of this state” and Mississippi customers
213
would not directly benefit from the line. This is consistent
with a Florida court’s 1967 decision in Clark v. Gulf Power Co.,
where the court held that a state’s eminent domain power exists “only within its territorial limits for the use and benefit of
214
the people within the state.”
Even in states where courts have recognized the regional
benefits of interstate transmission to allow the use of eminent
domain, they have been careful to point out that such power
cannot be used without a showing of a significant, local public
use. For instance, in 1934, the Indiana Supreme Court held in
Shedd v. Northern Indiana Public Service Corp. that a utility
could exercise eminent domain authority to build an interstate
line and rejected arguments that a state-regulated public utility could not exercise eminent domain authority for any use in
215
interstate commerce, as opposed to solely in-state uses. In so
holding, however, the court made it clear that the state “will
take care to use this power for the benefit of its own people” but
would not refuse to exercise it simply because “the inhabitants
of a neighboring state may incidentally partake of the fruits of
216
its exercise.” Likewise, in Square Butte Electric Cooperative v.
217
Hilken, the North Dakota Supreme Court in 1976 upheld eminent domain authority for a transmission line to provide power
from North Dakota to members of an electric cooperative in

213. 460 So. 2d 107, 113 (Miss. 1984).
214. Clark v. Gulf Power Co., 198 So. 2d 368, 371 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967).
215. Shedd v. N. Ind. Pub. Serv. Co., 188 N.E. 322, 325–27 (Ind. 1934).
216. Id. at 325; see also Oxendine v. Pub. Serv. Co. of Ind., 423 N.E.2d 612,
617 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980) (citing Shedd and allowing exercise of eminent domain authority for an interstate electric transmission line to improve reliability for in-state customers even while it provided power to out-of-state customers and finding that the authority was “to furnish electricity to the ‘public’ not
to Indiana residents alone”).
217. 244 N.W.2d 519, 530 (N.D. 1976).
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218

Minnesota. The court found that North Dakota residents received benefits of increased electric service reliability even
though the direct energy benefits of the line went primarily to
219
out of state interests. While the opinion embraces a broader
vision of public use than many other states, the Court was careful to say that the law in the state was that in-state residents
220
must receive a “substantial and direct benefit” (not merely an
indirect advantage) even if other states are also benefited and
that the benefit to the state must be “attached to the territorial
limits of the state because the state’s sovereignty is also so con221
strained.”
Notably, at least some state regulators and courts appear
more willing to consider regional need and not require in-state
need in the context of interstate energy transportation infrastructure. For instance, in 2010, in Pliura Intervenors v. Illinois
Commerce Commission, the Illinois Court of Appeals upheld
the grant of eminent domain authority to an interstate oil pipe222
line on a showing of public need. Like interstate electric
transmission lines and unlike interstate natural gas pipelines,
authority for siting interstate oil pipelines rests with the
223
states. In that case, the interveners argued the commission
erred in considering regional, national, and global need in
granting eminent domain authority rather than solely the need
224
of Illinois citizens. The court deferred to the commission’s
broader view of public need based on the fact that the statute
225
did not require the narrow view. Thus, at least in Illinois,
there does not appear to be a requirement that there be a significant in-state benefit as opposed to a public benefit more
generally, in order to obtain eminent domain authority for an
interstate oil pipeline.
These cases illustrate the tension between federal policies
promoting increased interstate transmission of electricity and a
state regulatory system designed primarily to recognize instate interests. It is perhaps understandable why a state court,
218. Id. at 530–31.
219. Id. at 525.
220. Id. (citing Adams v. Greenwich Water Co., 83 A.2d 177 (Conn. 1951)).
221. Id. (citing Clark v. Gulf Power Co., 198 So. 2d 368, 371 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1967), and Grover Irrigation & Land Co. v. Lovella Ditch, Reservoir &
Irrigation Co., 131 P. 43, 55 (Wyo. 1913)).
222. Pliura Intervenors v. Ill. Commerce Comm’n, 942 N.E.2d 576, 584–85
(Ill. App. Ct. 2010).
223. See supra Part I.C.
224. Pliura Intervenors, 942 N.E.2d at 584.
225. Id.
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especially one that is subject to judicial elections, may wish to
weigh the costs of the line for its own citizens, while not paying
any attention to the benefits of the line that are felt by out-ofstate interests. But this also will encourage individual landowners to challenge eminent domain proceedings and may lead
states in the path of a proposed interstate line to refuse to approve the line where the in-state benefits are small and there
are more significant out-of-state benefits.
Such a myopic analysis of benefits in defining “public use”
not only interferes with federal policies regarding interstate
lines; it also allows existing monopolies such as incumbent
state utilities to extract monopoly rents because, in effect, the
law limits the ability of competing transmission operators
(which are often not based in that state) to obtain reciprocal access to eminent domain authority. To be sure, the Kelo Court
emphasized deference to state public use determinations, which
also means that states are free to adopt a broader, regional approach to public use as illustrated above by the North Dakota
226
and Indiana cases. But in the context of an interstate electricity market and strong federal policies in favor of planning and
constructing interstate transmission lines, dormant Commerce
Clause principles provide a plausible constraint on a state’s
narrow assessment of benefits in its definition of “public use”—
much as it allows for constitutional challenges to narrow benefit assessments under state utility siting laws. We return to the
force of this argument below.
C. BANS ON OUT-OF-STATE APPLICANTS AND DIFFERENCES IN
PARTICIPATION RIGHTS
State laws not only limit what can be considered in approving a siting or eminent domain application. Some states also
limit who can apply or, through strict intervention standards,
limit the procedural rights of participants in the siting or eminent domain process. Although basic procedural questions of
state law are seldom questioned beyond the Due Process
Clause, the interstate transmission siting issue highlights how
such procedures also can effectuate violations of dormant
Commerce Clause principles and doctrine.
Under the utility laws of many states, out-of-state applicants are banned altogether from applying for either siting or
eminent domain powers. Some state siting authorities lack the
power to even consider applications where a state legislature
226. See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 482–83 (2005).
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has not authorized them to do so. Many state siting statutes
limit applicants to those who are a “public utility”—which typically means that a firm is taking on an obligation to serve retail
227
customers in that particular state. For example, Florida’s Supreme Court has interpreted its power plant siting statute to
limit siting to only those suppliers who are Florida utilities or
228
who have contracts with Florida utilities. The court reasoned
that the state’s siting statute “was not intended to authorize
the determination of need for a proposed power plant output
that is not fully committed to use by Florida customers who
229
purchase electrical output at retail rates.” Effectively, merchant power plants—who sell power in bulk power markets but
do not serve retail customers—are precluded from locating in
Florida for purposes of entering the interstate market unless
230
they have already contracted to serve Florida customers.
In the context of electric transmission lines (as opposed to
power plants themselves), many states limit the ability to obtain a siting certificate to “public utilities.” The question of
whether merchant lines, which are often in the business of
building interstate lines to transport renewable energy and
compete with incumbent public utilities, can obtain a certificate
or exercise eminent domain authority at all is unclear in many
states—because they cannot apply to obtain approval in the
first instance. Recent research shows that some states expressly ban merchant lines from exercising eminent domain authority, other states expressly allow merchant lines to exercise eminent domain authority, and the law is unclear in a majority of
231
states. This research concludes that as of 2013, Florida, Kentucky, Michigan, Montana, New Mexico, Oregon, Rhode Island,
Vermont, and Wisconsin grant merchant transmission lines
eminent domain authority by statute; Kansas and Oklahoma
grant such rights through PUC orders; Illinois, Maryland, New
Hampshire, and Nebraska prohibit merchant transmission
lines from exercising eminent domain by statute; Arkansas and
Connecticut prohibit such rights through PUC orders; and all
other states have statutes that are unclear and lack a definitive
232
interpretation by a state PUC or court. Moreover, the issue is
227. See Klass, Takings and Transmission, supra note 1, at 1124–26.
228. Tampa Elec. Co. v. Garcia, 767 So. 2d 428, 435 (Fla. 2000).
229. Id.
230. See id.
231. See Klass, Takings and Transmission, supra note 1, at 1124–26.
232. Id.; see also id. at app. A. Notably, although the Tampa Electric Co.
case placed limits on the ability of power plants to obtain a siting certificate
unless it was selling significant power to Florida utilities, the Florida statute
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arising more frequently, especially where legislation is ambiguous, as the cases below illustrate.
For instance, in 2008, the Montana Department of Environmental Quality issued a Certificate of Compliance for the
Montana-Alberta Tie Line, a 214-mile merchant transmission
line now owned by Enbridge Energy, to transmit primarily re233
newable energy from Montana to Alberta, Canada. When the
proposed transmission line developers began eminent domain
proceedings against a landowner in the path of the line, the
landowner argued there was no public use justifying eminent
domain because the proposal was for a merchant line rather
than a public utility that would serve Montana customers. The
district court agreed and dismissed the eminent domain action.
Soon after, the Montana legislature enacted a law that made
clear that all transmission lines that receive a certificate of
compliance are a per se public use and authorized to exercise
eminent domain. Thus, when the district court’s decision went
up to the Montana Supreme Court on appeal, the court reversed based on the new legislation. While there were additional challenges to the new law, the courts ultimately dis234
missed them and the line went into service in 2013. The
initial lawsuit challenging eminent domain authority illustrates, however, the uncertainty in this area of law, the wide
divergences in state approaches, and the difficulty these uncertainties pose to those who wish to invest in interstate transmission lines.
Indeed, the issue has come up in many states that have not
responded with clarifying legislation, like Montana, to address
ambiguities in statutes or outright bans that prevent out-ofstate merchant transmission companies from competing with
in-state utilities to build interstate transmission lines. For example, Clean Line Energy Partners has proposed five, separate
direct current (DC) high voltage transmission projects to bring
wind energy to population centers in different parts of the
country. One of the lines, the Plains & Eastern Clean Line, is
governing electric transmission lines explicitly includes “independent transmission systems” within the definition of an “[e]lectric utility” eligible to apply
for siting certification and to exercise eminent domain. See FLA. STAT.
§§ 403.522(12), 403.531(1), 403.539 (2015).
233. See Montana-Alberta Tie-Line, ENBRIDGE, http://www.enbridge.com/
DeliveringEnergy/Power-Transmission/Montana-Alberta-Tie-Line.aspx
(last
visited Oct. 16, 2015).
234. Montana-Alberta Tie Line Now Fully Operational, POWERING
ALBERTA (Sept. 18, 2013), http://poweringalberta.com/2013/09/18/montana
-alberta-tie-line-now-fully-operational.
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designed to bring wind energy from the Oklahoma Panhandle
235
region to southeastern states. As part of the siting process,
Clean Line sought a certificate of public convenience and necessity along with a separate certificate of environmental compliance and public need from the Arkansas Public Service
236
Commission in 2010. The Arkansas PUC denied Clean Line’s
request without prejudice because such certificates could only
be granted to a “public utility” in the state. Because Clean Line
was proposing the line as a “merchant” transmission project, it
was not assuming any obligation to provide customers retail
electric service and therefore could not obtain public utility sta237
tus. The Arkansas PUC stated:
The difficulty the Commission now faces is that the law governing
public utilities was not drafted to comprehend changes in the utility
industry such as this one—where a non-utility, private enterprise endeavors to fill a void in the transmission of renewable power that is
much needed but for which the Commission is unable to afford any
regulatory oversight. . . . [T]he Commission’s decision is based on that
fact that it cannot grant public utility status to Clean Line based on
the information about its current business plan and present lack of
238
plans to serve customers in Arkansas.

The Kentucky PUC issued a similar decision in 2013, finding that a transmission-only company could not obtain a certificate of public convenience or exercise eminent domain authority because it would not be providing retail utility service in
239
Kentucky subject to PUC jurisdiction. A Kentucky state cir235. See Welcome to the Plains & Eastern Clean Line Website, CLEAN LINE
ENERGY PARTNERS, http://www.plainsandeasterncleanline.com/site/home (last
visited Oct. 16, 2015).
236. PLAINS & EASTERN CLEAN LINE, CLEAN LINE ENERGY PARTNERS 9
(2011)
http://www.cleanlineenergy.com/sites/cleanline/media/resources/1222
Update_ PLains_Eastern_August2011.pdf (seeking partnership with Southwestern Area Power Administration to use federal siting authority under the
Energy Policy Act of 2005 to address limitations in state law preventing Clean
Line from obtaining state approval for lines).
237. Id.; In re Plains & E. Clean Line L.L.C., Docket No. 10-041-U, Order
No. 9, 9–10 (Ark. Pub. Serv. Comm’n Jan. 11, 2011), http://www.apscservices
.info/pdf/10/10-041-u_41_1.pdf.
238. In re Plains & E. Clean Line L.L.C. at 10–11.
239. AEP Kentucky Transmission Co., Case No. 2011-00042, 2013 WL
2639388, at *3–6 (Ky. Pub. Serv. Comm’n June 10, 2013); see also CONN. GEN.
STAT. §§ 16-50x(b), 16-50z, 16-244p (2015); Conn. Light & Power Co. v.
Huschke, 409 A.2d 153, 155 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1979); Transenergie U.S. Ltd.,
No. 00-06-14, 2000 WL 33121599, at *4 (Conn. Dep’t Pub. Util. Control Oct.
18, 2000) (holding that Transenergie was not an “electric distribution company” because it did not provide retail or distributed electric service within the
state and thus could not exercise eminent domain to build a transmission
line); James J. Hoecker & Douglas W. Smith, Regulatory Federalism and Development of Electric Transmission: A Brewing Storm?, 35 ENERGY L.J. 71,
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cuit judge also ruled in 2014 that a proposed 1100-mile natural
gas liquids pipeline, known as the Bluegrass Pipeline, does not
qualify for an eminent domain in the state because it would not
have an “off-ramp” allowing the delivery of such liquids to Ken240
tucky customers. Despite a post-Kelo state law that clearly
recognized an exception for “common carriers” the court emphasized that the pipeline was not “in public service” and
therefore not regulated as a utility in the state, so the Bluegrass applicant in effect had no power to condemn under the
241
state’s law.
In addition, many states have long-standing laws or practices (sometimes grounded in obscure adjudicative orders) that
grant incumbent utilities a “right of first refusal” to construct
electric transmission lines that connect to the local utility. Although FERC Order No. 1000 placed some limits on these kinds
of preferences for incumbent utilities in FERC jurisdictional
tariffs and agreements, it did not disturb rights of first refusal
under state siting and permitting laws. As James Hoecker and
Douglas Smith describe in a 2014 article, many state first refusal preferences apply only to low-voltage, local transmission
lines and thus do not interfere with Order No. 1000’s goal of facilitating regional transmission planning and encouraging nonutility, merchant companies from participating in order to cre242
ate a more dynamic market for regional transmission lines.
Still, Hoecker and Smith identify multiple states that in recent
years have created broad first refusal preferences for incumbent utilities that include such rights for high-voltage, interstate lines, including Minnesota, North Dakota, South Dakota,
243
North Carolina, and Nebraska. They observe that these state
laws “threaten to prevent or significantly reduce the competition that FERC sought to establish in Order No. 1000 among
multiple potential transmission developers for large regional
86–88 (2014) (discussing state barriers to transmission line siting and highlighting proceedings in Kentucky, Arkansas, and Missouri).
240. Robert H. Thomas, Kentucky Judge: Private Pipeline Lacks Eminent
Domain Power—Not in Public Service Because It Is Transporting Through
Kentucky, Not to Kentucky, INVERSECONDEMNATION.COM (Mar. 26, 2014),
http://www.inversecondemnation.com/inversecondemnation/2014/03/kentucky
-judge-private-pipeline-lacks-eminent-domain-power-not-in-public-service
-because-it-is-trans.html.
241. Kentuckians United to Restrain Eminent Domain, Inc. v. Bluegrass
Pipeline Co., No. 13-CI-1402, 2014 WL 10246980, at *11–17 (Ky. Cir. Ct. Mar.
25, 2014), aff’d, No. 2014-CA-000517-MR, 2015 WL 2437864 (Ky. Ct. App. May
22, 2015).
242. Hoecker & Smith, supra note 239, at 88–90.
243. Id.
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244

projects.”
In a recent series of decisions reviewing RTO compliance
filings under FERC Order 1000, FERC Chairman Bay has expressly questioned whether state right of first refusal laws vio245
late the dormant Commerce Clause. From a practical litigation perspective, challenging such preferences and bans on outof-state or non-utility applicants under dormant Commerce
Clause doctrine could well prove difficult. Often, all that may
be present is summary dismissal of an application as beyond
the authority of the regulator, under a statute that was enacted
decades earlier and without any legislative history or, worse
still, under a longstanding practice supported by an obscure
agency adjudicative order that only state agency lawyers or repeat players in the state siting process will know. Litigants
challenging such regimes are likely to be relying on facial challenges, rather than as applied challenges—especially where the
246
application of the statute gives no discretion to the regulator.
However, whether a facial or as applied challenge is
brought, under dormant Commerce Clause doctrine these distinctions that prohibit out-of-state applications would appear to
be per se discriminatory. Even if not discriminatory on their
face, there is little doubt that such restrictions are discriminatory in their purposes and effect. In some instances, there may
be legislative history indicating a clear discriminatory purpose.
Yet this seems unlikely as many state siting statutes that limit
applicants to “public utilities” are relics of an earlier era.
Until the 1990s, transmission lines were primarily built by
vertically-integrated utilities serving customers in a particular
state, not large utilities serving customers across multiple
247
states. However, in today’s energy industry, where power is
more actively supplied and traded in interstate commerce, the
effects of this kind of discrimination seem obvious—merchant
transmission lines simply will not be proposed at all in these
states. This can potentially restrict sources of energy from other states from becoming available to customers in that state at
all. Perhaps such a distinction is grounded in goals such as en244. Id. at 90; see also Linda L. Walsh & Noelle J. Coates, Walking the
Fuzzy Bright Line: The Legality of State ROFR Laws Under FERC Order 1000,
PUB. UTIL. FORTNIGHTLY, Sept. 2013, at 40.
245. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
246. If the statute is not clear, this arguably would give some discretion to
the regulator, and an “as applied” challenge would seem appropriate. But if all
the regulator does is conclusively assert that it lacks authority, a reviewing
court is effectively forced to address the issue as a facial challenge.
247. See supra Part I.B.
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suring the protection of ratepayers within a state, but a state
would be hard-pressed to maintain that limiting out-of-state
applicants for new transmission lines is the least discriminatory alternative available to it when it comes to protecting ratepayers. For example, state regulators typically retain authority
over retail rates and have ample opportunity to protect customers through retail ratemaking proceedings. Foreclosing the
ability of out-of-state sources to become available to customers
in the first place does not even allow state regulators the opportunity to compare the relative costs of power in the first instance. Moreover, merchant transmission companies, unlike
public utilities, do not receive any recovery at all from ratepayers but instead take on the full risk of the project’s success in
the market—a fact that could make any effort to justify such
restrictions on the grounds that they benefit in-state consumers
appear “illusory” at best.
Indeed, even under the more deferential Pike balancing
test, these kinds of bans raise dormant Commerce Clause problems. In challenging such bans under this more deferential
test, applicants may be hard pressed to lay out a full legislative
record of a discriminatory purpose at the time of enactment—
especially where many of these statutes were codified decades
ago. However, given the changes that have occurred to the utility industry over the past several decades, and the obvious incentives incumbent utilities in some states may have to use old
statutes to foreclose any new entrants, states should not be allowed to use the passage of time to evade the reach of dormant
Commerce Clause principles. At a minimum, Pike balancing
would require a state to explain why, given the way the industry operates today, the restrictions on who can apply under its
siting statute continue to produce legitimate benefits under the
Pike balancing test, in terms of consumer and environmental
protection. A state’s failure to provide such an explanation
alone should lead to failure to meet the Pike balancing test—
and this seems to be relevant whether the challenge is a facial
challenge or an applied challenge to the state siting regime. It
is also well established that, when such explanations are provided, they must be non-illusory, suggesting that using blanket
consumer protection rationales as a basis for bans on out-ofstate applicants is likely to fail as a legitimate justification under both a strict scrutiny and Pike analysis.
Even states that do not ban out-of-state applicants outright
or prioritize local over out-of-state applications may face problems with their siting or eminent domain procedures under
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state law to the extent that these procedures work to, in effect,
impose a significant burden on interstate commerce. This can
occur most obviously through procedural limits on intervention
or standing. Many states have laws or established practices
that allow incumbent utilities to drive the energy resource
248
planning process or that leave regulators considerable discretion to limit intervention in utility siting or eminent domain
proceedings to those who are most directly affected by a regula249
tor’s decision. It is not always clear that an out-of-state firm
would have an opportunity to intervene in a proceeding where
it is not filing a transmission proposal application. Even if the
right to intervene in a siting or eminent domain proceeding can
be established, the costs of participating in a state siting proceeding will typically be higher for any out-of-state firm, who
may need to hire local counsel and assert their interests from
afar. As compared to an in-state firm already providing service,
any out-of-state firm seeking to enter and provide new service
to a market is likely to face a serious disadvantage in a siting
process (where it would typically be requesting approval in the
face of opposition from an incumbent firm) or in an eminent
domain process (where it would be challenging a narrow “public
use” assertion).
In allowing challengers to litigate whether Virginia’s hospital certificate of need program procedures produce a significant burden on out-of-state applicants and whether any legitimate local benefits can justify it, the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit, in Colon Health Centers v. Hazel, recognized how the lack of a level procedural playing field in a state
permitting process that bans access to a market can raise seri250
ous questions under dormant Commerce Clause doctrine. The
challengers were out-of-state firms that sought to offer radiology and imaging services in Virginia. They faced the same certificate of need requirement as did Virginia firms, but they did
not wish to undergo the state’s “lengthy, costly, and unpredictable application process,” which takes years and provides multiple opportunities for in-state firms to challenge the appli248. See, e.g., Uma Outka, Siting Renewable Energy: Land Use and Regulatory Context, 37 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1041, 1058–59 (2010) (describing the planning process in Florida).
249. Typically, state administrative procedure would allow those directly
affected to intervene, but absent an express statutory standard recognizing
out-of-state firms, intervention is likely relegated to the discretion of agency
regulators.
250. Colon Health Ctrs. of Am., L.L.C. v. Hazel, 733 F.3d 535, 542–45 (4th
Cir. 2013).
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The court highlighted the challenger’s allegations that:

Virginia’s certificate-of-need program grants established, in-state
economic interests the power to obstruct the market entrance of new,
primarily out-of-state competitors in two ways. First, by requesting
fact-finding conferences, established interests can dramatically
lengthen the application process, thus increasing the costs and uncertainty borne by the applicant. Second, objecting firms may influence
the substantive outcome of the process through an effective adversar252
ial presentation at the conference.

Notably, without even getting to the substance of the certificate standards, the court observed how the state’s intervention process can “grant[] a structural edge to local firms: if an
established, in-state facility desires to expand its operations, it
will necessarily face one fewer objector than would an out-of253
state firm that seeks to enter the market de novo—itself.”
Although the court did not find Virginia’s scheme unconstitutional, it reversed a district court dismissal of the challenger’s
claim. In requiring further factual findings, it noted that even if
the law is not facially discriminatory, “[t]he Pike test requires
closer examination . . . when a court assesses a statute’s burdens, especially when the burdens fall predominantly on out-of254
state interests.” Similarly, if an out-of-state competitor can
present actual evidence of a discriminatory effect on interstate
commerce under a state siting or eminent domain transmission
process, it may be able to successfully mount a similar dormant
Commerce Clause attack to a state regime’s claim to procedural
neutrality.
IV. TAILORING STATE LAWS AND PRACTICES TO
FACILITATE COORDINATION
In a 2014 case dismissing a legal challenge to an interstate
natural gas facility, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit stated:
Given the choice, almost no one would want natural gas infrastructure built on their block. “Build it elsewhere,” most would say. The
251. Id. at 540–41.
252. Id. at 544.
253. Id.
254. Id. at 545 (quoting Yamaha Motor Corp. v. Jim’s Motorcycle, Inc., 401
F.3d 560, 569 (4th Cir. 2005)). On remand, the district court granted summary
judgment for the defendant after evaluating additional evidence, including
new evidence of the benefits of the program by the state and statistical evidence that the approval rate for in-and out-of-state firms was roughly equal.
See Colon Health Ctrs. of Am., L.L.C. v. Hazel, No. 1:12-CV-615, 2014 WL
5430973, at *7 (E.D. Va. Oct. 23, 2014).
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sentiment is understandable. But given our nation’s increasing demand for natural gas (and other alternative energy sources), it is an
inescapable fact that such facilities must be built somewhere. Decades ago, Congress decided to vest the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission with responsibility for overseeing the construction and
expansion of interstate natural gas facilities. And in carrying out that
charge, sometimes the Commission is faced with tough judgment calls
255
as to where those facilities can and should be sited.

The same considerations are present in siting and permitting of interstate electric transmission lines: the nation’s citizens want the lights to stay on but no one wants a high-voltage
transmission line where it may interfere with their home, view,
256
favorite park, or farming operations.
The difference, of
course, between the siting of interstate natural gas facilities
and interstate electric transmission lines is that many decades
ago, Congress recognized the potential holdout problem in the
context of natural gas facilities and created a federal process to
257
override parochial concerns in favor of the national interest.
Because of the history of the development of the electric grid,
which did not require a national infrastructure until recent
years, there is no federal authority to override state holdouts as
there is in the natural gas context. Certainly, Congress could
address this issue and create a federal siting process for interstate electric transmission lines just as it did decades ago for
natural gas pipelines and related facilities. We and other scholars have analyzed the benefits and costs of such a transfer of
authority—as well as the dim prospects for such a transfer in
258
today’s political climate—in earlier work. Of course, there are
other approaches as well, such as Congress creating a regional
transmission siting framework or FERC issuing more orders
along the line of Order No. 1000 to require regional collaboration between states and utilities and attempting to preempt
state barriers to out-of-state entrants that exist currently
through state right-of-first-refusal laws granted to incumbent
259
utilities.
255. Minisink Residents for Envtl. Pres. and Safety v. FERC, 762 F.3d 97,
100 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (dismissing claims that FERC’s decision to approve a natural gas compressor station was arbitrary and capricious and a violation of the
Natural Gas Act).
256. See, e.g., Glicksman, supra note 78, at 6–11; McLaughlin, supra note
15, at 404–05.
257. See generally Alexandra B. Klass & Danielle Meinhardt, Transporting
Oil and Gas: U.S. Infrastructure Challenges, 100 IOWA L. REV. 947 (2015) (discussing the reasons behind Congress’s enactment of the Natural Gas Act and
the law’s provisions relating to interstate natural gas pipeline siting).
258. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
259. See, e.g., 18 C.F.R. pt 35, supra note 64; Hoecker & Smith, supra note
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Our central claim in this Article is that dormant Commerce
Clause review provides an independent ground for courts to
help overcome regulatory holdout problems and promote interstate coordination where state laws are challenged, even absent
any affirmative federal action on the issue. We maintain that,
in considering dormant Commerce Clause challenges to such
regimes, courts must, at a minimum, evaluate political process
concerns with state regulation in order to help ensure that the
state decision-making framework allows for some consideration
of out-of-state benefits. This Part clarifies the scope and practical implications of our proposal.
We first explain in Section A why dormant Commerce
Clause challenges will likely have different implications for
state policies governing siting and eminent domain for interstate energy transportation infrastructure, like electric transmission lines, than for many state energy and climate policies
such as RPSs and renewable fuel mandates. Put simply, there
are greater concerns over state holdouts and assembly problems in cases involving physical, interstate infrastructure—
concerns that threaten the very heart of interstate markets in
energy. We discuss some limitations on the scope of our proposal, in terms of its application to different problems, including the problem of inertia and state regulatory inaction.
Then in Section B, building on Part III, we provide some
practical guidance for state legislatures and PUCs, with the
goal of retaining state control over the process without discriminating against out-of-state actors or interstate energy markets. We recommend that state legislatures adopt laws explicitly allowing and clarifying the appropriateness of considering
“regional benefits” of new transmission lines, rather than focusing solely on instate benefits in both siting and eminent domain
proceedings. We also recommend that post-Kelo limits on economic development takings designed to protect private property owners include clear safe harbors for interstate projects that
operate as common carriers in interstate commerce or that are
regulated as public utilities at the federal level. Finally, our
study of state siting and eminent domain regimes highlights
how states must be attentive to how the regulatory process can
create structural barriers for out-of-state participants. States
should eliminate statutory provisions that prevent out-of-state
actors from applying for certificates or exercising eminent domain authority, so long as they meet other statutory require239, at 88–90 (discussing first refusal rights and their impact on interstate
competition to build regional transmission lines); see also supra Part III.C.

198

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[100:129

ments that ensure the state can fully consider the environmental and economic costs and benefits of the line. Some states
have moved in this direction, but many states have not. Our
study of state siting and eminent domain regimes shows how,
in the absence of state legislative and PUC actions to reduce
barriers to out-of-state stakeholders, project developers who are
not able to avail themselves of state siting or eminent domain
approval are in a strong position to bring dormant Commerce
Clause challenges to many existing state laws, PUC decisions,
and court decisions denying market entry or eminent domain
authority to out-of-state applicants.
A. SCOPE OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENT TO CONSIDER
OUT-OF-STATE BENEFITS
We have argued for a revitalized approach to dormant
Commerce Clause review aimed at reducing the kinds of regulatory holdouts that can impair coordination in energy policy
and markets. This approach requires courts to evaluate whether state siting and eminent domain regimes allow for consideration of benefits beyond a particular state’s jurisdiction. The
approach has doctrinal implications: it opens up the possibility
for challenges based on evidence of a significant discriminatory
effect, requires states to provide a justification for discriminatory approaches, and also requires states to show that any discriminatory regimes are narrowly designed to achieve this purpose. Even where there is not a significant discriminatory
impact, it also challenges regulators to articulate non-illusory
reasons for nonreciprocal differences in procedures and considerations. Under such an approach to dormant Commerce
Clause review, courts would focus on whether the political and
regulatory process under which decisions are made allows for
some consideration of benefits that are not based solely on instate interests. We also see courts as having some role in evaluating the legitimacy of state justifications, but only insofar as
those claims of benefits do not meet the threshold for being legitimate and non-illusory. Importantly, our proposal is not a
roving invitation for reviewing courts to balance or engage in
cost-benefit analysis themselves. In this sense, it addresses objections to dormant Commerce Clause review raised by those
who are concerned about the institutional capacity of courts to
second-guess the policy choices of politically accountable state
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260

decision makers, or the incommensurability problem present261
ed with cost benefit balancing by judges.
Our approach to revitalizing dormant Commerce Clause
doctrine in reviewing state energy infrastructure siting regimes
may appear to be in tension with the spirit, if not the results, of
some recent cases addressing constitutional challenges to state
climate change initiatives and renewable energy programs. To
date, when presented with dormant Commerce Clause challenges to initiatives to promote renewable and clean energy
programs, reviewing courts have been largely deferential to
262
state programs. For example, in Rocky Mountain, the Ninth
Circuit upheld California’s low carbon fuel standard, applying a
deferential approach to assessing the state’s objectives in ad263
dressing climate change. According to the Ninth Circuit, the
state’s objectives in addressing the carbon impacts of various
fuels served to justify the differential impact on Midwestern
264
fuel producers.
As we highlight above, this approach serves to encourage
state experimentation and flexibility in addressing the difficult
problems presented with climate change. Indeed, some environmental law scholars praise such forms of “adaptive federalism,” to the extent that they allow climate policy to flourish in
states even when Congress and federal regulators have taken
265
no action at all. Shouldn’t judicial deference to these kinds of
pro-environment state regulatory programs be a cause célèbre
for anyone concerned with the environment? And why shouldn’t
a reviewing court apply a similarly deferential approach to
260. See supra note 110 and accompanying text (citing Roberts Court decisions that raise concerns about unnecessary judicial supremacy in dormant
Commerce Clause review).
261. See, e.g., Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enters., Inc., 486 U.S.
888, 897 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring) (noting the inappropriateness of a scale
analogy or of balancing where there is incommensurability, because “[i]t is
more like judging whether a particular line is longer than a particular rock is
heavy”).
262. See supra Part II.B. There are, of course, exceptions, but these seem
largely limited to dicta, settled cases, or outlier district court opinions. See supra notes 159–61 and accompanying text.
263. Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, 730 F.3d 1070, 1107 (9th
Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 2874 (2014).
264. Id. at 1105–06.
265. See, e.g., David E. Adelman & Kirsten H. Engel, Adaptive Federalism:
The Case Against Reallocating Environmental Regulatory Authority, 92 MINN.
L. REV. 1796, 1827–31 (2008); Ann E. Carlson, Iterative Federalism and Climate Change, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 1097, 1102, 1158–61 (2009) (lauding “iterative federalism schemes” as “innovative regulatory mechanisms [which] can
have the best of both worlds”).
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state decisions not to site interstate transmission lines—which
also might be said to promote greater experimentation in state
approaches to addressing energy issues? Our analysis of the
holdout problem created by transmission line siting and eminent domain regimes shows why linking deference to federalism has only limited appeal.
To begin, it is not at all clear to us that Rocky Mountain is
inconsistent with the approach to dormant Commerce Clause
review that we advance in this Article. As the Ninth Circuit
emphasized in its Rocky Mountain decision, in adopting its policies the State of California emphasized not only the benefits to
firms and residents in the state, but it also placed a particular
emphasis on the out-of-state benefits created by addressing the
grave and difficult problems associated with carbon emis266
sions. The court even lauded California for not isolating the
267
state’s renewable fuel market. This is exactly the approach
we are urging in the evaluation of transmission line siting. As
we have argued, state and local weighing of benefits beyond its
borders serves to provide for a broader set of political process
concerns in siting decisions and promotes the forms of interstate coordination reinforced by dormant Commerce Clause
principles by helping to overcome the isolated parochialism reflected by holdouts. Rocky Mountain reinforces how the consideration of out-of-state benefits by a state can be considered as
evidence that a state is not relying solely on protectionist motives in adopting an approach to promoting clean energy.
Nevertheless, although there are some definite parallels,
dormant Commerce Clause review of interstate transmission
line siting and eminent domain decisions is required to address
a special type of problem that is not presented by new state renewable fuel standards. Rocky Mountain allowed the state to
consider out-of-state benefits; but our approach to dormant
Commerce Clause review would go even further, requiring the
state or local government to allow for consideration of such
benefits even where a legislature or regulator has failed to do
so on its own. In the context of energy infrastructure, unlike
state fuel standards, the necessity of coordination among regulators for any jurisdiction to succeed with its regulatory initiatives makes the consideration of out-of-state benefits even more
essential. In the context of multi-jurisdictional energy infrastructure projects, a single state or local holdout can keep an
infrastructure project from going forward. By contrast, with
266. Rocky Mountain, 730 F.3d at 1097.
267. Id. at 1092, 1096.
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state renewable electricity or renewable fuel standards, coordination across jurisdictions is not necessarily a predicate to pursuing any particular state’s regulatory goals. California, for example, can pursue its regulatory goals in addressing the carbon
content of fuel consumed in California regardless of how Arizona or Wyoming regulates the carbon content of fuel. Although
coordination may be desirable to advancing California’s interests, from a broader regional or national policy basis, its renewable fuel program does not require coordination between
268
adjacent states or rely on any type of interstate reciprocity.
Yet another structural feature of energy infrastructure siting presents a unique concern for a dormant Commerce Clause
challenge that new renewable energy requirements do not.
Many energy infrastructure-siting regimes are steeped in
longstanding (and sometimes even informal) traditions of local
land use regulation or in siting statutes that predate the con269
temporary changes that have transformed energy industries.
This temporal mismatch between energy infrastructure siting
regimes and the current issues facing the industry creates a
particularly disturbing opportunity for incumbent monopolists
who wish to use state laws to isolate themselves from interstate
markets: such regimes allow regulators to hide behind the
complacency of the status quo, sometimes even benefitting instate monopolists at the expense of out-of-state firms seeking to
compete in the provision of interstate energy infrastructure for
power supply. This concern is of undoubtedly greater significance in assessing the federalism aspects of energy infrastructure siting than in assessing statutes of more recent vintage,
such as state renewable energy requirements. The environmental and land use concerns that are sometimes used to justify
continued state or local attention to siting transmission lines
are not unimportant—and we are not arguing that they should
be ignored or preempted by federal law—but courts also should
not allow them to be used as a silent subterfuge to protect incumbent monopolists under outdated regulatory programs that
268. Some renewable energy programs may be more steeped in coordination or reciprocity between states than others. For example, some state RPS
programs rely on regional coordination in renewable energy certificate trading. To the extent that a state RPS program depends on this kind of coordination and states in the same regional market fail to recognize nonreciprocal
terms in their renewable electricity regulations, a similar dormant Commerce
Clause analysis would be appropriate in evaluating state renewable energy
program features that pose a similar holdout challenge.
269. This particular concern of fitting new wine into old bottles with
transmission line siting is also discussed in Brown & Rossi, supra note 1.
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no longer fit the reality of interstate energy markets.
Nor should regulators be allowed to hide behind legislative
action or to claim that their permitting and siting regimes
should escape constitutional scrutiny because they are not authorized to act. As has been recognized in other constitutional
contexts, the failure of government regulators to act against the
backdrop of changing circumstances can still constitute a constitutional violation. Christopher Serkin, for example, argues
that the ecological threat presented by sea level rise may either
require the government to act to address it or, if it fails to do so,
270
pay damages under the Takings Clause. Similarly, it does not
seem relevant to whether there is a dormant Commerce Clause
violation if legislators or regulators fail to act to approve a line
at all. Instead the question is whether existing state siting and
permitting regulatory regimes, as reflected in the laws and
practices of a state, present an obstacle to the federalism values
the doctrine is designed to promote. A dormant Commerce
Clause violation can just as readily occur through a process
271
that presents a structural obstacle to out-of-state firms as it
can through the more conventional approach of challenging the
discriminatory aspects of a substantive decision by state regulators.
B. PROMOTING COORDINATION BY ELIMINATING
DISCRIMINATORY BARRIERS
As explained in Part III, the energy infrastructure siting
regimes in states around the country contain significant barriers that prevent out-of-state developers or merchant transmission lines from receiving approval, including eminent domain
authority, to build lines, or from exercising the same procedural
rights as incumbent utilities in the siting process. This serves
as a significant obstacle to entry in interstate electricity and
electricity infrastructure markets. These barriers include: (1)
regulator refusals to site lines based on a narrow assessment of
benefits; (2) refusing to grant eminent domain authority to a
transmission line or other energy infrastructure project based
on post-Kelo legislation or by requiring local need to establish
“public use”; or (3) explicit bans on out-of-state applicants for
transmission line siting permits or use of eminent domain au270. See Christopher Serkin, Passive Takings: The State’s Affirmative Duty
To Protect Property, 113 MICH. L. REV. 345, 390 (2014).
271. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit recently recognized
this as potentially problematic in the health certificate of need approval process. See supra Part III.C and accompanying text.
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thority in the state, or other differences in procedural rights.
This Subpart first considers actions states can take to eliminate some of the more significant substantive legal barriers
under state law to facilitating coordination in interstate energy
markets and to ensure that the decisions of regulators do not
run afoul of the dormant Commerce Clause. It then suggests
ways in which states can correct the procedural aspects of state
siting and eminent domain laws that serve to limit any new
market entry to incumbent utilities, effectuating a form of
structural discrimination against interstate commerce. In both
instances, we maintain, would-be applicants have a compelling
basis for bringing challenges to state regimes under the
dormant Commerce Clause, providing state legislatures and
regulators a propitious opportunity to reform and clarify their
laws to correct any constitutional deficiencies.
1. Correcting the Myopic Stance in Siting and Eminent
Domain Decisions
State regulators often balance factors in making decisions
to approve new energy infrastructure projects in ways that that
impose a significant discriminatory burden on interstate commerce. To take a common example discussed above, state siting
laws will often explicitly limit a regulator’s considerations in
assessing “need” to in-state interests—as may occur when a
state regulator is charged by statute to favor the protection of
native load customers—presenting deficiencies under dormant
Commerce Clause doctrine. Where such statutes expressly
foreclose any consideration of out-of-state benefits, or limit the
“need” determination to benefits for in-state customers only,
they are particularly likely to face dormant Commerce Clause
challenges. States that continue to use siting statutes that
make “need” determinations dependent on only in-state benefits should make revising their laws to allow for a broader
range of considerations a high legislative priority, given their
legal vulnerability.
If a state’s legal regime completely forecloses any consideration of out-of-state benefits, this is especially problematic under the dormant Commerce Clause. As we show above, even regimes that leave regulators discretion to weigh different costs
and benefits can be successfully challenged where regulators
fail to balance any out-of-state considerations in making a decision. Open-ended discretion to regulators may, in theory, allow
272. See supra Part III.
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for consideration of a broader range of benefits in approving
“need” based on the public interest. However, to the extent that
regulators exercise their discretion narrowly and refuse to consider any out-of-state benefits, instead focusing entirely on instate beneficiaries in making their public interest determinations, their decisions may be legally vulnerable.
For those states with ambiguous statutory language—
leaving regulators discretion to adopt a narrow determination
of “need” or “public use” that excludes regional need or regional
benefit—state legislatures can amend their statutes to clarify
that it is appropriate and, in fact, required, for PUC regulators
and courts to consider regional need and regional use along
with local need and local use in their decision-making process.
This would address the dormant Commerce Clause deficiencies
in the Arizona Corporation Commission’s rejection of the proposed Southern California Edison interstate transmission line
and the Mississippi and Florida cases discussed in Part III that
excluded regional need and regional public use in barring outof-state project applicants and the interstate transmission lines
273
in question. State regulators or courts can readily accomplish
the same result without new legislation by recognizing regional
need and regional use in interpreting ambiguous statutes to
avoid dormant Commerce Clause violations, as the Illinois
274
Court of Appeals did in the Pliura Intervenors case. State
courts considering such language would be well advised to consider this as a straightforward application of a canon to interpret ambiguous language to avoid constitutional deficiencies.
With regard to post-Kelo barriers to economic development
projects, some state “public use” statutes limit or ban the use of
eminent domain for solely economic development purposes,
275
such as the Missouri law at issue in the Jackson case. After
Kelo, how a state defines “public use” for Takings Clause purposes is generally subject to considerable legislative deference.
However, our analysis highlights how state definitions of “public use” should not escape the scrutiny of federal courts, especially for large-scale energy infrastructure projects that require
the approval of multiple jurisdictions. Instead, we maintain
that, at some level, the dormant Commerce Clause must constrain states from adopting unduly narrow assessments of
“public use” if they limit or ban interstate infrastructure devel273. See id.
274. 942 N.E.2d 576 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010).
275. 398 S.W.3d 472, 476 (Mo. 2013); see also supra notes 207–12 and accompanying text.
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opment. In other words, even after Kelo, the dormant Commerce Clause provides an independent constitutional constraint on a state’s definition of “public use.”
One objection to imposing a dormant Commerce Clause
constraint on state definitions of “public use” may be to argue
that state or local eminent domain powers are a sovereign function and therefore exempt from dormant Commerce Clause
276
scrutiny under the market participant exemption. However,
the mere fact that a state or local government exercises its
power as a sovereign, such as invoking eminent domain authority, does not limit the application of the dormant Commerce
277
Clause. To take one example, zoning is a well-accepted sovereign power of state and local governments. Yet it has been held
that a state or local government cannot appeal to its status as a
sovereign in exercising zoning powers to prohibit a retail chain,
such as Starbucks, from operating in its jurisdiction through a
278
discriminatory zoning ordinance. Certainly, the market participant doctrine can serve as an established exception to the
dormant Commerce Clause where the state itself acts as a consumer or producer in an interstate market, but the Court consistently has subjected sovereign functions such as taxation to
279
dormant Commerce Clause scrutiny. Eminent domain authority is no different, and it is thus appropriate to apply the
dormant Commerce Clause to the assessment of “public use” by
state courts, legislatures, and regulators—especially in scenarios where there is reason to be concerned about adverse effects
276. Thanks to Ilya Somin for raising this point with us.
277. Indeed, the Court has recognized limits to the market participant exception when states exercise sovereign functions. See Sporhase v. Nebraska ex
rel. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941 (1982) (holding that a state’s property interest in
water does not limit dormant Commerce Clause scrutiny of a ban on the export of water without first obtaining a permit).
278. See Cachia v. Islamorada, 542 F.3d 839, 842 (11th Cir. 2008) (finding
unconstitutional a local ordinance that would have prohibited chain retail establishments, such as a Starbucks coffee shop).
279. See supra Part II, which discusses tax cases such as General Motors v.
Tracy, 519 U.S. 278 (1997). Even if state ownership and control were recognized as the formal touchstone for application of dormant Commerce Clause
doctrine, there still would need to be some qualifications to its application.
Clearly, if a state itself owns a public road, this would not allow the state to
limit its use by out-of-state trucks—a state may be able to avail itself of the
market participant exemption when it is one of many participating in the
market, but courts still seem wary of extending this exemption to dormant
Commerce Clause doctrine where the state owns the entire market or controls
all of the means of commerce in a market. See, e.g., Coenen, supra note 168, at
450 (citing state-owned highways as an example of the principle that states
cannot “deny all forms of state-made benefits to outsiders”).
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on interstate coordination.
Post-Kelo, as state legislatures have renewed their attention to spelling out what is and is not a public use, the resulting
enactments vary considerably. To their credit, many post-Kelo
enactments expressly recognize traditional common carrier or
regulated utility projects as automatically qualifying for “public
use.” At first blush, this kind of a safe harbor would appear to
be designed to address the kind of problem we have highlighted. However, if through ambiguity this safe harbor is somehow
tethered to a narrow understanding of benefits by the utility
regulator, there is still a possibility that, even in a state that
enacts a common carrier or public utility safe harbor, such a
regime can impose a significant burden on interstate commerce
and present the same problems as an overly narrow definition
of “need” in siting statutes. In Kentucky, for example, despite a
defined apparent safe harbor in post-Kelo legislation for common carriers and utilities, state courts still seem to interpret
“public use” narrowly to exclude an entity that is not a utility
280
delivering energy to customers in the state. To avoid such issues, states should consider expressly recognizing as a “public
use” any facility that is required to transport energy as a common carrier or utility in interstate commerce, even if that
transport is not regulated by the state. To the extent that this
definition of “public use” is tied to federal regulation of oil pipelines or electric transmission lines to achieve goals such as energy reliability, it certainly does not threaten the ability of a
state legislature to continue to address the kinds of economic
development purposes with which Kelo was most concerned.
Other post-Kelo laws that ban economic development leave
still more ambiguity. To the extent that this is the case, a party
bringing a dormant Commerce Clause challenge should be allowed some opportunity to present evidence of whether a regime significantly burdens interstate commerce. In Jackson,
the post-Kelo statute was applied to an in-state port authority
and the court did not find any preference for in-state economic
development over out-of-state or regional economic develop281
ment. Any burden on interstate commerce on these facts was
thus incidental, at most, and subject to more deferential review. This would therefore be evaluated under the more deferential Pike test, which weighs the benefits of the ban and the
burdens on interstate commerce. As we have argued, however,
even under Pike, an assessment of benefits for such a regime
280. See supra note 241 and accompanying text.
281. Missouri ex rel. Jackson v. Dolan, 398 S.W.2d 472, 478–83 (Mo. 2013).
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can still be illusory. At a minimum, a jurisdiction would be required to show it did not foreclose the consideration of out-ofstate benefits in adopting or applying the “public use” definition. But it will prove difficult for challengers to win such cases
without good evidence that the state legislature had a discriminatory purpose or was seeking to foreclose any evaluation of
broader benefits. When state legislatures enacted their postKelo bans (mostly in the late 2000s), most state legislatures
were focused on local government exercise of eminent domain
for urban and suburban redevelopment and perceived abuses of
that authority—much like the facts in Kelo itself. It is unlikely
state legislatures even contemplated how the new legislation
might apply to efforts to build energy transportation infrastructure.
The best way for states to avoid these kinds of federalism
challenges to eminent domain authority is through legislative
clarity in statutory definitions of “public use.” States concerned
with limiting abuses of economic development post-Kelo should
focus on correcting actual abuses of their eminent domain process—whether by governmental entities or private parties—
rather than using the occasion for new legislation to expand
bans on new market entrants. Indeed, such bans do nothing to
hinder abuses of eminent domain by government actors or by
the most powerful private energy developer interests in a state,
which is typically an incumbent private monopolist. To avoid
dormant Commerce Clause problems the focus should be on ensuring that any regulator’s failure to site pipelines or transmission lines does not effectuate a significant burden on interstate
commerce, and that the consideration of out-of-state benefits
associated with a line is not completely prohibited in post-Kelo
eminent domain statutes. Clarifying the availability of a “public use” safe harbor for interstate infrastructure facilities that
are regulated as common carriers or in the public interest at
the federal level seems to be the safest path for a state to avoid
dormant Commerce Clause challenges to post-Kelo eminent
domain statutes.
2. Fixing Procedures that Run Afoul of Dormant Commerce
Clause Principles
Perhaps many states will chose to retain the status quo in
siting and eminent domain law and practices out of inertia, to
protect incumbent utilities, or as a result of political pressure
by in-state actors who either want to retain a competitive advantage in interstate energy markets or wish to limit the con-
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struction of such infrastructure for environmental or other reasons. Indeed, as described in Part III, in recent years, several
states have enacted new right-of-first-refusal laws that give incumbent utilities a significant advantage over merchant
transmission lines in obtaining permission to construct regional
transmission lines in those states. The approach to dormant
Commerce Clause review that we advance in this Article offers
out-of-state firms an option to do more than only challenge the
substance of a state decision, as routinely occurs in dormant
Commerce Clause litigation. We also propose that disfavored
applicants be allowed to use the dormant Commerce Clause to
challenge procedures that expressly exclude them from applying for transmission lines permits or exercising eminent domain, as well as structural processes that impose a significant
burden on interstate commerce.
As noted in Part III, many states have explicit statutory
bans on out-of-state applicants applying for transmission line
siting permits or exercising eminent domain authority. These
statutes generally state that only “public utilities” can apply for
permits or exercise eminent domain authority, thus preventing
merchant transmission lines and other out-of-state applicants
from building and operating interstate transmission lines that
cross the state. In light of the regional nature of the electric
grid, the need for transmission expansion throughout the country to meet reliability and clean energy goals, and the opportunity for states to benefit from electricity exports or imports,
particularly renewable energy exports and imports, it is critical
for states to address these issues.
To the extent that there are express bans on out-of-state
applicants or laws that limit participation in the market for
building new interstate transmission lines or exercising eminent domain to incumbent utilities, such laws may well discriminate against interstate commerce. For instance, Maryland
law states that only “electric companies” may build transmission lines in the state and may only exercise eminent domain if
282
the power is needed to serve Maryland electric customers;
282. MD. CODE ANN., PUB. UTIL. § 7-207(b)(3) (2015). This statutory section
also contains a right of first refusal in favor of the incumbent utility in the
portion of the state where the line is proposed. Id.; see also MD. CODE ANN.
PUB. UTIL., § 7-103(a) (1998) (“An electric company incorporated in Maryland
may . . . construct a power line . . . .”); MD. CODE ANN., PUB. UTIL. § 1101(h)(1) (2015) (“‘Electric company’ means a person who physically transmits
or distributes electricity in the State to a retail electric customer.”); MD. CODE
REGS. 20.79.04.01 (2015) (setting forth requirements of application for building a transmission line, including the need for the project to meet demands for
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Nebraska law permits only an “electric supplier” defined as a
public power district, municipality, or cooperative to exercise
283
eminent domain for transmission lines; and New Hampshire
grants eminent domain authority for transmission lines or related infrastructure only to a “public utility” where necessary to
284
meet “reasonable requirements of service.”
Moreover, dormant Commerce Clause case law would appear to support standing by merchant transmission operators
and others who would benefit from an enhanced transmission
line market to challenge such laws even without the need to go
through the application process and obtain a denial. In general,
courts have found that both in-state and out-of-state market
participants may challenge state laws on dormant Commerce
Clause grounds if they can show the law’s restrictions limit the
285
plaintiff’s access to the interstate market in question. However, to the extent standing or ripeness may be an issue, the outof-state applicant or non-incumbent utility can apply for a permit or seek to exercise eminent domain and then, if there is a
denial, can argue on appeal that the denial violates dormant
Commerce Clause principles. This could have been a basis for
appeal in the Arizona case involving Southern California Edison if the out-of-state utility had chosen to appeal the Arizona
decision.
service and impact on the economy of the state); Maryland Office of People’s
Council, Regulatory Activities—Electricity—Significant Cases, MARYLAND
http://www.opc.state.md.us/RegulatoryActivities/Electricity/SignificantCases
.aspx#PSC_Case_No_9223 (stating, in connection with an interstate PATH
transmission line proceeding, that “[t]he PSC agreed with OPC’s position that
Maryland law permits only an electric company—that is, a company that
transmits or distributes electricity to retail customers—to apply for and receive a CPCN, and that Potomac Edison could not just file on behalf of PATH,
an affiliate company”).
283. NEB. REV. STAT. § 70-301 (2009); see id. §§ 70-1014.02(1)(a) (2011), 701014.02(6) (2011), 76-710.04(3)(a) (2010).
284. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 371:1 (2012).
285. Florida Trans. Serv., Inc. v. Miami-Dade Cty., 703 F.3d 1230, 1256
(11th Cir. 2012) (summarizing numerous Supreme Court dormant Commerce
Clause decisions, including standing requirements, and stating that “the
dormant Commerce Clause may bar . . . laws that protect local economic interests and squelch outside competition, even where in-state and out-of-state
companies are affected”); Freeman v. Corzine, 629 F.3d 146 (3d Cir. 2010);
S.D. Farm Bureau, Inc. v. Hazeltine, 340 F.3d 583 (8th Cir. 2003); see also
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992) (setting forth constitutional standing requirements as follows: first, the plaintiff must have suffered “an injury in fact,” meaning that the injury is (a) “concrete and particularized” and (b) “actual or imminent, not ‘conjectural’ or ‘hypothetical’”
(quoting Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 102 (1983)); second, the injury
must be traceable to the defendant’s challenged action; third, it must be “likely” rather than “speculative” that a favorable decision will redress the injury).
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Indeed, as discussed in Part III, there is some precedent
that states cannot discriminate against out-of-state entities in
connection with the exercise of eminent domain to build energy
transportation infrastructure. For instance, in Kern River Gas
Transmission Co. v. Clark County, the U.S. District Court for
the District of Nevada held that a statute that limited eminent
domain authority for natural gas pipelines to projects that
promoted “local” concerns rather than the interests of inter286
state commerce violated the dormant Commerce Clause. Similarly, in Dakota, Minnesota & Eastern Railroad Corp. v. South
Dakota, the U.S. District Court for the District of South Dakota
found that a South Dakota statute that allowed eminent domain only when it had the purpose of benefitting South Dakota
interests discriminated against interstate commerce and violated dormant Commerce Clause doctrine as applied to a pro287
posed interstate railway line.
For states with express bans on out-of-state applicants, a
court would likely apply strict scrutiny to the law in question,
as the courts did in the Nevada and South Dakota cases just
described, and it would be very difficult for states to demonstrate that these bans on out-of-state applicants are for a legitimate, non-protectionist purpose and that there are no less dis288
criminatory means that would advance this purpose. Indeed,
for most states, the reason for the bans is to protect incumbent,
in-state utilities—if there was a reason at all rather than merely an assumption decades ago that only public utilities would
build transmission lines. With regard to whether there are less
discriminatory means of ensuring that transmission lines are
built only when there is a public need and only for a public use,
286. Kern River Gas Transmission Co. v. Clark Cty., 757 F. Supp. 1110,
1118–19 (D. Nev. 1990) (“[A] state statute requiring the exercise of eminent
domain over public lands to be dependent on whether it is ‘necessary’ to local
concerns, rather than the concerns of interstate commerce, is a clear violation
of the Commerce Clause.”).
287. Dakota, Minn. & E. R.R. Corp. v. South Dakota, 236 F. Supp. 2d 989,
1016 (D.S.D. 2002), aff’d in part, rev’d in part on other grounds, 362 F.3d 512
(8th Cir. 2004) (holding that a statute stating that the “exercise of the right of
eminent domain is a public use consistent with public necessity only if the use
of eminent domain has as its purpose providing railroad transportation to
shippers in South Dakota, for commodities produced, manufactured, mined,
grown, used, or consumed in South Dakota” violates dormant Commerce
Clause doctrine because it “purposefully discriminates against out-of-state
commerce on its face”); see also Saxer, supra note 8, at 1505, 1538–40 (discussing the Kern River and Dakota, Minnesota & Eastern Railroad cases).
288. See supra Part II.A.1 (discussing the burden on states to justify market bans that discriminate against interstate commerce or impose a significant
burden on out-of-state participants in interstate markets).
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in each case, state regulators can ensure they have sufficient
regulatory oversight over the out-of-state applicant, by requiring them to apply for status as a state-regulated “independent
transmission company” or similar entity and requiring them to
meet the same standard as incumbent utilities to build the line
or exercise eminent domain authority. Moreover, any given
transmission line has the same potential impacts on private
property rights in the state regardless of whether the line is
built by an incumbent utility or a merchant transmission company, again, assuming the same regulatory oversight of in-state
and out-of-state actors. Even if a court were to find that such
laws were nondiscriminatory, the same factors above would appear to weigh in favor of a dormant Commerce Clause violation.
It is unclear how the state benefits from excluding out-of-state
applicants other than for the discriminatory purpose of protecting incumbent utilities and the burdens of such exclusion, in
the form of burdening state efforts to meet state RPS requirements and impeding development of renewable electricity, are
significant.
With regard to state right-of-first-refusal laws, which give
a hard or soft preference to incumbent utilities in siting and
permitting transmission lines, FERC has stated expressly that
its Order No. 1000 does not invalidate state preferences but instead merely limits their use and application in FERC jurisdic289
tional tariffs and agreements. FERC found that a federal
right of first refusal has “the potential to undermine the identification and evaluation of more efficient or cost-effective solutions to regional transmission needs, which in turn can result
in rates for Commission-jurisdictional services that are unjust
and unreasonable or otherwise result in discrimination by pub290
lic utility transmission providers.” This speaks very clearly to
the right of first refusal in FERC-approved tariffs and as a part
of the tariff filing in RTO markets. However, FERC did not
preempt or take a clear position on state laws that contain a
right of first refusal—in fact it expressly stated it did not intend to “limit, preempt, or otherwise affect” any state or local
law regarding the construction of transmission facilities, including “authority over siting or permitting of transmission fa291
cilities.” To the extent that these are not incorporated into
tariffs filed with FERC, they are not preempted or otherwise
289. Order No. 1000, FERC Stats. & Regs., 136 FERC ¶ 61,051, 18 C.F.R.
pt. 253 (2011).
290. Id.
291. Id. pt. 227.
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affected by Order No. 1000. In fact, FERC itself recognized
“that removing federal rights of first refusal in Commissionjurisdictional tariffs and agreements will not eliminate all obstacles to transmission development that may exist under state
or local laws or regulations and, therefore, may not address all
challenges facing non-incumbent transmission development in
292
those jurisdictions.”
293
As FERC Chairman Bay has recently noted, it remains
an open question whether the in-state preference in a state
right of first refusal law conforms to dormant Commerce
Clause principles. If such a right of first refusal is directly provided to a municipal utility or government-owned entity, in effect the law is providing a preference to the government, it thus
becomes a “market participant,” and that removes its regulatory treatment from any dormant Commerce Clause scrutiny.
However, as FERC recognized, to the extent some states continue to allow private incumbent utilities a right of first refusal, these can continue to serve as a significant obstacle to
transmission line development in interstate commerce. We believe that there are compelling arguments that any conclusive
state right of first refusal favoring incumbent firms, in the form
of a non-rebuttable presumption, runs afoul of dormant Commerce Clause principles. By providing incumbent utilities a
right of first refusal to build high-voltage transmission lines,
whether or not these are a part of regional transmission plans,
states act to discriminate against merchant lines and other outof-state actors that would potentially create a more vibrant interstate power market and reduce electricity costs for states
294
and regions, particularly for renewable energy. Regardless of
the validity of state rights of first refusal under Order No. 1000
as matter of federal preemption, such laws appear to constitute
a facial violation under dormant Commerce Clause doctrine. A
merchant transmission or other non-incumbent utility company
that does not qualify for a first refusal preference and is not
given the opportunity to build a regional transmission line under the same criteria as an incumbent utility could seek to challenge any line approved under such a preference. States seeking to avoid constitutional challenges to their siting regimes
would be well advised to revisit these kinds of preferences for
292. Id. pt. 257.
293. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
294. Ill. Commerce Comm’n v. FERC, 721 F.3d 764, 774–75 (7th Cir. 2013)
(discussing the importance of renewable energy, transmission grid expansion,
and grid reliability).
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private incumbent utilities—and to ensure that, to the extent
that any in-state priority exists at all, it is rebuttable and
serves some legitimate purpose.
More generally, the examples we discuss in this Article
highlight how states must be attentive to their eminent domain
and siting procedures to ensure that the framework of state
laws and practices does not, in practical effect, impose a significant burden on interstate commerce. The particular interstate
coordination problem with transmission siting shows how entrenched state procedures can present serious obstacles for new
entrants in interstate energy markets. Even if a state does not
ban out-of-state applicants, the participation rights afforded in
the application and hearing process may systematically disfavor out-of-state applicants. A process that routinely favors the
ability of in-state incumbents to object to new proposals may
present a form of structural discrimination against out-of-state
applicants, and is subject to a facial challenge under dormant
Commerce Clause doctrine. For example, if a challenger is able
to show a disparity in outcomes between incumbent and out-ofstate firms that imposes a significant burden on interstate
commerce, a state would need to show a legitimate public purpose and the availability of no less restrictive procedural alternative in order for its program to stand. It may prove difficult
to bring facial challenges to existing regulatory procedures, as
it will inevitably require extensive factual development by challengers, but evidence of the discriminatory burden such procedures impose in different scenarios can better allow state regulatory procedures to conform to dormant Commerce Clause
295
principles.
By eliminating incumbent rights of first refusal and reforming intervention rules to accommodate out-of-state firms
on neutral terms, states may better ensure an even-handed siting approval process for new transmission lines. In many cases,
the state statutes limiting siting permits or eminent domain
authority to public utilities were drafted many decades ago
when merchant transmission lines and regional transmission
organizations did not exist, wind and solar energy for electricity
was negligible, transmission lines were built exclusively by
public utilities that also provided in-state retail service, and the
need for interstate electricity markets and transmission was
295. See, e.g., Suzanna Sherry, Foundational Facts and Doctrinal Change,
2011 ILL. L. REV. 145 (2011) (discussing the role of foundational facts to understanding doctrine, its underlying assumptions, and its evolution and
change).
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not viewed as critical for reliability and clean energy goals. For
some states, inviting more participants to the decision-making
process for constructing and operating transmission lines is in
their economic interest—if not the interests of their incumbent
utilities—particularly where a state has ample wind and solar
resources that would benefit from energy exports, or faces high
relative electricity prices (as does, for example, California) that
could benefit from energy imports. To the extent procedural
features such as bans on out-of-state applicants are merely a
function of obsolete laws on the books, we would encourage
state legislatures to revise those laws to remove language limiting applicants to incumbent utilities, and grant siting and eminent domain authority to all transmission lines that meet the
criteria to obtain a certificate of need. The same is true for
those states where the statute is ambiguous as to whether outof-state applicants and merchant lines can seek a siting permit
or exercise eminent domain. Many of these states, which constitute a majority, may make reference to “utilities” as applicants, which does not make clear whether a merchant line can
apply for some sort of “utility” status for purposes of building
the line. These states can follow the lead of Montana, which
clarified that all transmission lines may seek siting permits
and exercise eminent domain authority, or Florida, which specifically includes “independent transmission systems” within
the definition of an “electric utility” eligible to apply for siting
296
permits and exercise eminent domain authority.
Through legislative, regulatory, and judicial actions, states
can eliminate laws on their books that raise dormant Commerce Clause suspicions, and avoid future procedures that unconstitutionally limit interstate transmission lines and entry to
interstate markets by out-of-state applicants. In each of the
situations we describe, there is no legitimate reason that out-ofstate firms or merchant transmission companies proposing to
build interstate transmission lines should not be able to apply
for certificates of need and exercise eminent domain authority
if they can meet the economic, environmental, and other requirements that in-state actors must meet in order to build
such lines. In this sense, state PUCs and state courts still retain significant authority to reject an application for economic
or environmental reasons or find there is no public use for eminent domain purposes based on market factors or other reasons—but not based on whether the applicant is an incumbent
utility or a new entrant coming from outside of the state. Thus,
296. FLA. STAT. § 403.522(12) (2015); see also supra note 228.
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our approach retains state authority over physical energy infrastructure siting and eminent domain while removing existing state barriers that violate federalism principles under
dormant Commerce Clause doctrine.
CONCLUSION
It would be a mistake for federal courts reviewing state
regulatory regimes to embrace blanket deference under
dormant Commerce Clause principles, especially in contexts
where multi-state coordination is necessary for energy transportation projects and climate initiatives to succeed. Such an
approach only serves to encourage more state and local holdouts in addressing new energy infrastructure and challenging
problems such as climate change, and is not true to federalism’s
core value of promoting interstate coordination.
Revitalizing dormant Commerce Clause review in this context would allow courts to ensure that, at the very minimum,
states allow for some consideration of out-of-state benefits in
siting and eminent domain regimes. By giving a voice to consumers and firms who otherwise would lack a role in a state’s
political process, our proposed approach addresses the regulatory holdout problem and helps to reduce the likelihood that
states will barricade themselves from energy infrastructure
projects and interstate markets. More than approaches that
link judicial deference and federalism and encourage each state
to go it alone, our approach encourages states to coordinate
with each other in the consideration of policies that produce
benefits that transcend jurisdictional boundaries. Perhaps
more than any other example where dormant Commerce
Clause principles have been used to question state laws, the
examples of siting and eminent domain in energy transportation infrastructure highlight how judicial scrutiny of state procedures and participation rights can also facilitate better coordination in interstate commerce.
Our approach is sensitive to concerns raised by critics of
dormant Commerce Clause review, including some current Supreme Court Justices, who are skeptical about the institutional
capacity of courts to balance costs and benefits in reviewing
state regulations. Only a state legislature or regulator will be
able to weigh the costs and benefits of a project and make the
ultimate political choice to participate or not participate in a
multi-state infrastructure project. This is a state prerogative
and recognizes that politicians and regulators must evaluate
the interests of citizens, landowners, and the environment as
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they balance various considerations. But state regulators and
courts should not be allowed to hide behind obsolete laws or
practices, including entrenched and established procedures,
that limit who can propose an interstate transmission line, who
can intervene to oppose it, or what can be considered in weighing its merits. At a minimum, we maintain that a decisionmaking framework must allow legislators or regulators to make
a choice and that this choice must make some legitimate effort
to balance the benefits of regional energy infrastructure and
climate initiatives against the backdrop of interstate coordination. By contrast, applying strong judicial deference to state
regulators under the banner of federalism only allows outdated
regulatory regimes, practices, and procedures to encourage isolationism and parochialism and serves to obstruct interstate
coordination.
A revitalized approach to dormant Commerce Clause review also has some very practical consequences for state utility
laws as well as the practices of regulators. It highlights the potential legal vulnerability of many extant state siting and permitting regimes, and especially procedures that are designed to
favor the proposals or concerns of incumbent monopolists. It also suggests how regulators and lawmakers can improve these
regimes to better advance the goals of federalism and interstate
power markets. Energy markets today have evolved far beyond
the traditional utility model that developed in the twentieth
century. In previous eras (when interstate power markets were
very limited) it may have been consistent with federalism to allow states to isolate their power supply and demand from
neighboring jurisdictions by embracing protections for incumbent utilities in the planning and construction of transmission
lines. However, given the importance of interstate coordination
to the operation of modern energy markets, state and local governments should no longer be allowed to use existing utility
and permitting laws to isolate energy markets and imperil the
values of federalism.

